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PRIVACY'S PROBLEM AND THE LAW OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
William J. Stuntz*

Almost all talk about the law of criminal procedure begins with
two assumptions. The first concerns what that law is about.
Although the constitutional doctrines that regulate the police protect a number of values or interests, one - privacy - tops the list.
The cases and literature on search and seizure, and to a lesser extent on self-incrimination, routinely emphasize the individual's ability to keep some portion of his life secret, at least from the
government. That is why Fourth Amendment cases talk about
whether evidence is in plain view (and hence no longer hidden from
the world1) and whether particular places tend to be the locus of
activities that most people like to keep secret.2 That is also why
Fifth Amendment cases talk about the defendant's interest in deciding for himself whether to reveal incriminating information; a major
underpinning of this "right to choose" is the defendant's interest in
keeping the information to himself.3 Privacy language and privacy
arguments are rampant in criminal procedure.4
The second assumption usually goes unspoken: criminal procedure, we all suppose, is a self-contained system. It has little or nothing to do with the rest of constitutional law. Constitutional law
courses ignore Fourth and Fifth Amendment doctrine, and criminal
procedure courses return the compliment; the literatures of crimi* Professor of Law, University of Virginia. I thank Akhil Amar, Lillian BeVier, Donald
Dripps, John Harrison, John Jeffries, Yale Kamisar, Nancy King, Michael Klarman, Larry
Kramer, Harold Krent, Debra Livingston, Glen Robinson, and Rip Verkerke for helpful
comments on earlier drafts. Special thanks are due to Louis Michael Seidman, who gave me
detailed comments on an earlier draft before either of us knew he would be responding to
this article in print, thereby allowing me to incorporate a number of his suggestions. I also
thank the participants in workshops at the University of Virginia and Vanderbilt Law Schools
for many useful criticisms and suggestions, Erik Lillquist and John Nalbandian for research
assistance, and the SOHIO Research Fellowship for financial support.
1. The examples are endless, but for two especially revealing ones, see New York v. Class,
475 U.S. 106 (1986), and United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
2. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
3. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 588-89 (1990); California v. Byers, 402
U.S. 424, 450-51 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
4. This focus is usually taken for granted, but not always. For a rare and interesting criticism, see Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"'s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1751 (1994).
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nal procedure and constitutional law do not speak to one another,s
and the cases do not cite each other. There is a lot to argue about
in Fourth and Fifth Amendment law, but the arguments seem to
have no effect on debates about the scope of the government's
power outside traditionally criminal areas.
These two assumptions cannot stand together. It seems easy
and natural to say that we need to protect the individual's interest
in keeping some things secret, or at least away from the government's prying eyes, when we regulate the police. Privacy is a comfortable starting point for Fourth and Fifth Amendment law. Yet
much of what the modem state does outside of ordinary criminal
investigation intrudes on privacy just as much as the kinds of police
conduct that Fourth and Fifth Amendment law forbid. A privacy
value robust enough to restrain the police should also prevent a
great deal of government activity that we take for granted - activity that, at least since the New Deal, is unquestionably
constitutional.
To put it differently, a substantive problem lies at the heart of
criminal procedure: the law is grounded on the protection of a particular value, privacy, that implies aggressive substantive judicial review of a sort that we have not allowed for the past half-century.
Privacy, at least as the word is used in criminal procedure, protects
the interest in keeping information out of the government's hands,
and information is necessary to both criminal law enforcement
(where aggressive constitutional law is thought to be good) and ordinary regulation (where it is mostly thought to be bad). Criminal
procedure, or at least privacy-based criminal procedure, thus has a
good deal more substantive bite than we tend to suppose, and its
substantive implications push in some uncomfortable directions.
This problem casts light on a number of features of criminal procedure, both past and present. The idea that the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments guarantee broad privacy protection dates back at
least to Boyd v. United States, 6 an 1886 Supreme Court decision that
5. There are exceptions. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution,
100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALL. REv.
673 (1992); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 11 GEo. LJ. 19 (1988).
6. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Actually, the link between privacy and the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments predates Boyd; indeed, Boyd itself relies heavily on eighteenth-century antecedents to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. See 116 U.S. at 624-32. But Boyd solidified
the link, and it provides a useful starting point from which to assess more contemporary
developments.
The statement in the text should perhaps be qualified in another respect as well: Boyd's
conception of privacy protection was very much tied to the protection of property rights. See,
e.g., Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the
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laid the foundation for modern search and seizure and self-incrimination doctrine. To modern ears, Boyd sounds like an odd case to
lay that foundation: it was a civil forfeiture action arising out of a
tax dispute. 7 And Boyd was not unusual in this respect. Case law
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is filled with
regulatory disputes - antitrust cases, railroad regulation cases, and
the like - in which litigants used the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as shields against government oversight.8 Yet this civil use of
criminal procedure may not be so odd after all. Boyd's broad privacy protection arose around the same time that substantive due
process took flight; the substantive implications of Fourth and Fifth
Amendment privacy protection may not have seemed as troubling a
century ago as they do today. The limits the Court later placed on
Boyd's protection may have a great deal to do with changes in the
Court's view of those substantive implications.
Broad restraints on government power are more problematic today. Current Fourth and Fifth Amendment law seems to deal with
the problem through a series of special rules or exceptions, doctrines that treat some privacy intrusions as if they just don't count.
"Regulatory search" cases allow government searches of businesses
\vith little or no suspicion of misconduct,9 giving the government
much more leeway when enforcing fairly trivial regulations than it
has when enforcing laws against rape or murder. "Required
records" cases allow the government to compel concededly inci:iminating disclosures via civil regulatory statutes;10 once again this docFourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HAR.v. L. REv. 945, 951-56 (1977). The temptation is to

focus on the property aspect of Boyd and ignore privacy. That would be a mistake. Privacy
and property are fused in Boyd; that is, property seems to be protected as a means of protecting what the Boyd Court called "the privacies of life." 116 U.S. at 630. It is appropriate,
therefore, to treat Boyd as the foundation for contemporary criminal procedure doctrines
that aim to protect privacy.
7. The dispute in Boyd involved shipments of plate glass for use in the construction of a
post office building in Philadelphia. Boyd was accused of misrepresenting the amount of
glass on which he had received an exemption from import duties. The government subpoenaed customs invoices to prove the misrepresentation, and Boyd objected to the subpoena.
See Brief for Plaintiffs at 1-5, Boyd (No. 983); Brief for the United States at 1-2. Both briefs
are reprinted in 8 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND AROUMEN'IS OF nm SUPREME COURT OF nm
UNITED STATES: CoNSTITUI10NAL LAw (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
8. See infra notes 114-124 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (upholding a suspicionless search of
an automobile junkyard).
10. See, e.g., Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841
(1984) (upholding a requirement that college students register for the draft in order to apply
for student loans, notwithstanding that registration might require admitting earlier criminal
nonregistration); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) (upholding a subpoena requiring
a wholesaler to tum over various business records that government regulation required him
to keep, notwithstanding the fact that those records were then used against the wholesaler in
a criminal prosecution).
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trine gives the government greater power when enforcing run-ofthe-mill regulations than when investigating serious crime. Finally,
the "reasonable expectation of privacy" doctrine permits police officers to uncover the details of a suspect's finances 11 or phone
calls,12 even though the same doctrine reaffirms and constitutionally protects the privacy of lunch bags,13 cigarette packets,14 and the
underside of stereos.15 No plausible balancing of government need
against individual privacy interests can explain these results. Instead, they are best understood as the inevitable consequence of the
conflict between privacy-based criminal procedure and the constitutional revolution of the 1930s. In light of that conflict, it is hard to
see which side in these disputes is "liberal" and which is "conservative": broader protection of privacy (the supposedly liberal stance)
is the road back to the Four Horsemen, while reduced privacy protection (the "conservative" view) guards the integrity of the 1937
revolution.
There are two ways to resolve the tension. The system could
protect privacy consistently, across the board. But that course
would entail serious costs to the constitutional order under which
we have lived since the New Deal: tax forms, OSHA inspections,
routine government employment practices, and a host of other
things would be constitutionally suspect. The other alternative is to
reorient criminal procedure, to focus the law less on privacy and
more on what makes the police different from, and more threatening than, the government in its other guises. That task is already
underway, though it is mostly implicit. It needs to proceed further,
and more candidly.
11. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that a government request
that a bank tum over copies of an individual's deposit slips and checks is not a Fourth
Amendment search). The Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1982),
imposes some restrictions, but they are fairly gentle: law enforcement officers are not bound
to show probable cause or even reasonable suspicion as a precondition of obtaining records
of such things as bank deposits and withdrawals.
12. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that installation and use of a
"pen register," which records numbers called by a telephone, is not a Fourth Amendment
"search").
13. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (holding that law enforcement officers
must have probable cause, though not a warrant, before searching a paper lunch bag found in
the trunk of the defendant's car).
14. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (upholding the search of a crumpled cigarette packet incident to the defendant's arrest). Robinson held that the search of
the cigarette packet was permissible as long as the arrest was permissible. 414 U.S. at 236.
Nowhere did the Court suggest that opening the cigarette packet was anything other than a
Fourth Amendment "search." But cf. 414 U.S. at 237 (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that
an arrestee "retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person").
15. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987); see also infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
·
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Part I of this article addresses the connection between privacybased limits on police authority and substantive limits on government power as a general matter. Part II briefly addresses the effects of that connection on Fourth and Fifth Amendment law, both
past and present. Part ID suggests that privacy protection has a
deeper problem: it tends to obscure more serious harms that attend
police misconduct, harms that flow not from information disclosure
but from the police use of force. The upshot is that criminal procedure would be better off with less attention to privacy, at least as
privacy is defined in the doctrine today. Were the law of criminal
procedure to focus more on force and coercion and less on information gathering (a change that is already beginning to happen), it
would square better with other constitutional law and better protect
the interests most people value most highly.
I.

PRIVACY, POLICE INVESTIGATION, AND SUBSTANTIVE
RESTRAINT ON GOVERNMENT POWER

Criminal procedure is about, as the name says, procedure. One
can read widely in the cases and literature without uncovering any
indication that restraints on police practices have important substantive effects. Of course, they do. At a broad level, this observation is trite: all procedural rules have substantive effects. But it is
useful to see how criminal procedure casts its substantive shadow,
and how the size and shape of that shadow depends on the interests
the law chooses to protect.

A. Defining Privacy
To understand the implications of privacy-based criminal procedure one must start with some conception of privacy. That turns
out to be a problem, for the term means too much. In legal discourse privacy encompasses, among other things, the ability to engage in certain conduct free from government regulation,16 freedom
from being stared at or stalked or "singled out" in public,17 the
"right to be let alone," 18 and the ability to keep certain information
16. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
17. See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE LJ. 421, 432-33
(1980). The tort law equivalent is the claim based on intrusion upon seclusion. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1965).
18. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. a (1965); Tracey Maclin, The Decline of
the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 15 CORNELL L. REV. 1258,
1335 (1990).
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or aspects of one's life secret.19 If one takes privacy to mean all
these things, or some fuzzy and varying combination of them, it
quickly becomes impossible to say anything useful on the subject.
All outcomes make sense on some combination of privacy interests,
particularly when one balances them against an equally ill-defined
sense of government need.20
.
A more refined definition is needed. In the law of criminal procedure, two kinds of privacy seem to matter. The first is fairly definite: privacy interests as interests in keeping information and
activities secret from the government. The focus here is on what
government officials can see and hear, what they can find out. The
paradigmatic infringement of this kind of privacy is the act of reading someone's correspondence or listening to her telephone conversations, or perhaps rummaging through her bedroom closet. The
second kind of privacy is much harder to get one's hands on: it is
easier to say what it is not than what it is. It is not, other than
coincidentally, about protecting secrets and information. Rather, it 1
is about preventing invasions of dignitary interests, as when a police
officer publicly accosts someone and treats him as a suspect. Arrests or street stops infringe privacy in this sense because they stigmatize the individual, single him out, and deprive him of freedom.
Both sorts of privacy are protected in criminal procedure:
Fourth Amendment law regulates both wiretaps and arrests. And·
the two often go together: house searches, the heart of Fourth
Amendment concern, involve both types of injury. But the interests are neither equally important to the law nor equally well protected. On the contrary, informational privacy - privacy as
nondisclosure - is and has been preeminent. When courts decide
whether a given police tactic infringed a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" and hence whether the tactic is a "search" subject to
Fourth Amendment regulation, they ask whether the police saw or
heard something that any member of the public might have seen or
heard in a similar manner.21 The question, in other words, is
whether what the police did was likely to capture something secret.
19. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
20. The problem is especially hard if these various meanings hang together in some sense.
For an argument that they do, see Gavison, supra note 17.
21. E.g., Ciraolo v. California, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (upholding an overflight of a
private home against a Fourth Amendment challenge, and noting that "[a]ny member of the
public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers
observed"); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (upholding the electronic
tracking of the movements of defendant's automobile against a Fourth Amendment challenge, and noting that "[w]hen [defendant] traveled over the public streets he voluntarily
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular roads
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The reasoning of the cases is far from consistent; neither this norm
nor any other can fully explain the doctrine. Nevertheless, privacyas-secrecy dominates the case law.22
Two examples should suffice to make the point. The concept of
"plain view" - the idea that the police are not subject to any
Fourth Amendment constraint when they see something from a
vantage point they are entitled to take (sometimes because any
member of the public is entitled to the same vantage point) - is
the centerpiece of search law. This concept basically defines what is
a "search,"23 and hence defines what police conduct the Fourth
Amendment regulates and what conduct it leaves alone. With respect to things that are searches, the plain view concept determines
what must be separately justified. In short, it determines in an
enormous number of cases whether the Fourth Amendment has or
has not been obeyed. The concept makes sense only in terms of
'informational privacy. It flows out of the interest in keeping
secrets, not out of the interest in being free from unreasonable police coercion or from other kinds of dignitary harms that search
targets may suffer.
Consider some examples of how the plain view concept is applied. In Arizona v. Hicks, 24 police officers legally entered an
apartment to investigate a shooting. Once inside, one of the officers noticed a pair of expensive-looking stereos; he turned over
the turntables in order to copy down the serial numbers. The stereos turned out to be stolen. The Supreme Court found that looking at the underside of the turntables was a separate Fourth
Amendment "search" that needed to be separately justified; because the officer did not have probable cause to believe that the
stereos were stolen before looking at the serial numbers, this
in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited from public roads onto private property").

22. For one acknowledgment of the point, see RICHARD C. TURKINGTON ET AL., Pru.
(1992). This recently published casebook on privacy in the
law places search and seizure doctrine in a chapter on "Informational Privacy," rather than in
chapters on "Privacy Protection for Personality, Identity and Reputation" or "Privacy and
Autonomy."
23. See supra note 21. I am using plain view in its conceptual sense, not in its doctrinal
sense. Doctrinally, plain view refers to an exception to the warrant requirement for seizures
of evidence discovered during an otherwise legitimate encounter or search. The concept of
plain view is broader: the idea is that whenever the police see something from a vantage
point they are entitled to have, what they see is fair game. This idea is central not only to the
plain view exception to the warrant requirement but also to the determination of what a
"search" is to begin with.
VACY: CASES AND MATERIALS

24. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
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"search" was illegal.25 On the other -hand, in United States v.
I\;JJ&Jts,.26 the Court held that police stalking of suspects, as long as it
is done in public, receives no Fourth Amendment regulation at all.
The theory is that an officer is entitled to see anything, including
movements on public streets and in public places, that any member
of the public could see from a similar series of vantage points.21
These results do not make sense on any definition of privacy that
focuses on the interest in being "let alone" or on protecting against
dignitary harm. Given that approach, what happened in Hicks
would not be worth worrying about: turning over the stereo caused
no real dignitary harm. In dignitary terms the only issue would be
the legality of the search of the apartment in general. But if the law
seeks to protect informational privacy, each marginal search, each
additional place where the officer casts his eye, represents a separate issue and ought to be separately justified.28 The point holds
true for Knotts as well. In dignitary terms Knotts seems plainly
wrong, but in informational privacy terms it is at least plausible.
The same pattern appears in the relationship between the
Fourth Amendment's regulation of searches and its regulation of
seizures. Seizures, unlike searches, have no logical connection to
informational privacy: seizures are deprivations of property or liberty interests, not disclosures of things the suspect may wish to keep
secret. But both searches and seizures are expressly protected by
the Fourth Amendment. It follows that the Fourth Amendment
must protect something besides privacy-as-secrecy. Yet, as anyone
familiar with Fourth Amendment doctrine knows, seizures are far
less heavily regulated than searches. A police officer can grab me,
spin me around, force me to spread my arms and legs against the
wall, and frisk me, all in public view, based on a "reasonable suspicion" - say, a one-in-four chance - that I may have committed a
crime.29 The same officer cannot open the trunk of my car without .
25. 480 U.S. at 323-29.
26. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
27. 460 U.S. at 281-83.
28. Actually, the test appears to be not where the officer casts his eye but where he puts
his hand. In Hicks, the Court emphasized that the officer had moved the stereo in order to
see the serial number. 480 U.S. at 324-25.
29. The reasonable suspicion test comes from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-27 (1968).
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227-29 (1985), established that Terry's standard may
be satisfied by reasonable suspicion of an already completed crime. As for the "one-in-four
chance" language, that is my own extrapolation. The Supreme Court refuses to provide any
formulation other than a negative one: reasonable suspicion requires "considerably less than
proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence." United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1, 7 (1989). Professor LaFave's treatise says that the requirement is a "substantial possi-
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probable cause3o - a significantly tougher standard. So too, suspects may be arrested and imprisoned for up to forty-eight hours
without the approval of a judicial officer and without a showing that
getting such approval would have been terribly hard.31 But an officer cannot cross the threshold of my house without a warrant unless getting one was practically impossible.32
These lines show the degree to which the doctrine has been
dominated by the desire to protect individuals' interest in keeping
some parts of their lives secret, and the degree to which that value
has traditionally overshadowed all others in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Police-citizen encounters are intrusive, often traumatizing, in many ways and for· many reasons. But the law seems to
focus relentlessly on the harm caused by seeing or hearing something. That is what privacy usually means in criminal procedure.
The strength of the informational privacy interest in Fifth
Amendment law is less obvious and less strong. It is hard to explain
the basic structure of self-incrimination doctrine in informational
privacy terms: the privilege does not apply to physical evidence,
which can be at least as "private" as testimony,33 and it does not
protect immunized testimony, no matter how "private" in the ordinary sense of that word.34 Yet the privilege is still bedeviled by the
effort to articulate just what the relevant interest is. Why it is that a
defendant need not answer possibly incriminating questions?3S A
bility" of crime. 3 WAYNER. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ 9.3(b), at 431-32 (2d ed.
1987).
30. Under Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), officers may sometimes perform a
quick search of the passenger compartment of a car based on reasonable suspicion that weapons might be present. But such a "car frisk" does not include opening the trunk, 463 U.S. at
1048-53, which must be justified by probable cause.
31. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414-17 (1976), establishes the legality of warrantless felony arrests outside the home. Under County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S.
44, 55-58 (1991), arrestees may be held for up to forty-eight hours without being brought
before a judicial officer, though shorter periods of detention may be the subject of constitutional attack in particular cases, depending on the context and the reason for the detention.
32. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (holding that warrantless arrests in the
home are impermissible absent exigent circumstances).
33. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966). This apparently includes even
personal documents. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1
F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting the argument that a personal calendar was protected,
notwithstanding the assumption that the calendar was an extremely personal document);
Senate Select Comm. on Ethics v. Packwood, 845 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1994) (rejecting the
argument that Sen. Packwood's diaries are protected by the Fifth Amendment against subpoena by the Senate Ethics Committee during the course of an investigation of sexual harassment claims).
34. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
35. Thus the most famous Fifth Amendment writing of the past two decades is an article
that aims to show that no justification for the privilege works. See David Dolinko, Is There a
Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1063 (1986).
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large portion of the literature says that the answer is something
akin to informational privacy. Peter Arenella, for example, argues
that forcing someone to tell of his own wrongdoing violates the privacy of his mind and thoughts;36 Robert Gerstein suggests that it
transgresses the privacy of one's self-judgment.37 These are basically interests in nondisclosure - in keeping a category of information secret. Of course that is exactly what the privilege protects:
compulsion itself is not barred, only compulsion that produces a
kind of disclosure. That is why, as recently as a generation ago,
privacy protection was the dominant explanation for the privilege
among academics and judges alike.38 The interest in keeping
secrets is not as powerful as in Fourth Amendment law, and to a
large degree Fifth Amendment law has moved away from it.39 Yet
secrecy remains a conventional answer, though not the only answer,
to the question why we have a privilege in the first place.
In other words, though privacy means many things and though
Fourth and Fifth Amendment law protect many interests, one fairly
well-defined and fairly narrow interest, the interest in secrecy,
seems predominant. The primary goal of this article is to consider
what follows from protecting that interest. Accordingly, I will use
the word privacy in the narrower of the two senses mentioned
above, meaning an interest in keeping things secr:et from agents of
the government. This is not to say that there are not other sorts of
privacy interests (there are) nor that criminal procedure should ignore those interests (it shouldn't). But the brand of privacy that
Fourth Amendment law in particular, and Fifth Amendment law to
a lesser extent, protect most -_pri~acy ~ secregy -~ has some interesting implications. It deserves -more scrutiiiy than it has
received.
36. Peter Arenella, Schmerber and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 31 (1982).
37. Robert S. Gerstein, Privacy and Self-Incrimination, 80 Ennes 87 (1970). For a sitnilar argument that also seeks to ground the privilege in customs involving disclosure between
individuals, see R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 15 (1981).
38. See, e.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 450-51 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Robert B. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 SUP. CT. REv. 193. One
indication of the link between privacy and the privilege is the traditional view of the Fifth
Amendment as strongly linked to the Fourth. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57
(1961); 367 U.S. at 661-66 (Black, J., concurring).
39. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (largely abandoning Fifth
Amendment protection of the contents of documents, while retaining protection for the incriminating aspects of the act of producing them); see also infra notes 192-99 and accompanying text (discussing the abandonment of privacy and autonomy protection in police
interrogation law).
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The Police, Process, and Substance

Privacy in this narrower informational sense is a substantive
value, but it can also be seen as essentially procedural. Saying that
I have a strong privacy interest in the contents of my bedroom is
not the same as saying that any given conduct, in or out of my bedroom, should be free from punishment. Privacy-based limits on police investigation are limits on how the police gather information,
not on what criminal laws they may enforce. Thus, the probable
cause and warrant requirements do not restrict the government's
ability to decide what should be a crime, nor does the requirement
that suspects be given Miranda warnings when they are questioned.
That is why Fourth Amendment law and Miranda doctrine are aspects of criminal procedure and why criminal procedure is not usually seen as having much impact on the contents of substantive
criminal law.
Yet procedural limits on police investigation of crime do have
substantive effects, just as substantive conduct prohibitions have
procedural effects. Consider one famous argument about the Connecticut birth control statute at issue in Griswold v. Connecticut. 4 0
According to the majority opinion in that case, the statute criminalizing the use of contraceptives was improper in part because of the
way it would have to be enforced: through police searches of married couples' bedrooms.41 The same argument arises in debates
about drug policy. Criminalizing drug use puts pressure on the
legal system to tolerate police tactics such as undercover agents and
profile-based street stops.42 In general, different substantive crimes
lead to different kinds of investigative tactics, so that one might
plausibly wish to consider the investigatory process when considering what to criminalize.
The relationship works in the other direction as well. Just as a
law banning the use of contraceptives would tend to encourage bedroom searches, so also would a ban on bedroom searches tend to
discourage laws prohibiting contraceptives. If decriminalizing cocaine dealing would substantially reduce the use of undercover
40. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
41. 381 U.S. at 485-86 ("Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to
the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."). The argument is developed
at somewhat greater length in Justice Douglas's opinion in the predecessor to Griswold. See
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 519-22 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
42. This argument is standard among proponents of decriminalization. See, e.g., STEVEN
B. DUKE & ALBERT c. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST wAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS 116-17, 123-27 (1993).

March 1995]

Privacy's Problem

1027

agents in police work, so too would a ban on undercover agents
make it harder to punish cocaine dealing.43 A given rule of police
procedure may come close to a ban on the prosecution of some
kinds of crimes, and must always harm the prosecution of some
crimes more than others.
The substantive shadow cast by restraints on police practices can
also extend beyond criminal law. Suppose one were to adopt the
definition of self-incrimination used by Justice Douglas: the government compels self-incrimination whenever it forces someone to
say something that will cause him serious harm, whether the harm is
"infamy" or humiliation or possible criminal liability.44 The law
does not follow this approach to the privilege, but if it did, the privilege would disable every regulatory regime whose enforcement depends on compelling testimony that is unpleasant to the person
doing the testifying. That effect could cover a lot of ground, most of
which is not paradigmatically criminal. Most criminal prosecutions,
after all, do not depend on incriminating statements by the defendant.45 Some legal rules outside ordinary criminal law, on the other
hand, may be enforceable only if the government can require witnesses to testify, and the number surely mushrooms if "testify" is
broadened to include producing documents.46 A Douglas-style
privilege would render those rules useless.
43. This relationship between the way police can investigate crimes and the crimes they
can investigate is not symmetrical. A ban on searches of bedrooms might indeed render a
prohibition of contraceptive use almost unenforceable, and in that sense might look like the
equivalent of the holding in Griswold. Yet the ban on bedroom searches is both less and
more inclusive than the substantive ban on contraceptive laws. It is less inclusive because
there are ways of proving contraceptive use other than bedroom searches; these would not be
barred by the search rule. It is more inclusive because there are some things police might
want to look for in bedrooms other than evidence of contraception. The ban on bedroom
searches would thus limit the investigation of other crimes as well: it would make some drug
cases harder to solve, while making contraception cases almost impossible.
Indeed, because search and seizure rules cannot be kept wholly secret from offenders,
these substantive effects are likely to be greater than they initially appear. If bedroom
searches were suddenly forbidden, bedrooms would become a favorite hiding place for contraband that is now hidden in, say, basements. In other words, though limits on police investigation have substantive effects, the effects are complicated, and few procedural rules will be
the precise equivalent of direct substantive restraints on the definition of crimes. Nevertheless, the effects themselves are real and may extend quite far.
44. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 449-54 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting). As
Douglas's dissent indicates, this argument has a long pedigree. See 350 U.S. at 452-54 (citing
sources).
45. Consider drug cases, in which the key evidence is usually physical, and the police
often refuse any conversation with the defendant. See H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED
ZEAL 199 (1988) (noting that New York City police officers avoided any conversation with
narcotics suspects, relying instead on physical evidence).
46. Through most of Douglas's judicial career, documents were treated the same as oral
testimony for most purposes under the Fifth Amendment Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886), was still good law when Douglas wrote his dissent in Ullman, see 350 U.S. at 440-
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From the perspective of constitutional law, this is the kind of
substantive shadow that matters most. If constitutional law has an
"activist" sphere and a "deferential" sphere, criminal law and procedure belong in activist territory. The fact that criminal procedure
limits criminal law is therefore not such a big deal in terms of the
larger constitutional structure. For the past generation, day-to-day
rules of criminal investigation and trial procedure have been the
province of constitutional law.47 Constitutional limits on the definition of crimes, though less common, are nevertheless more advanced than substantive review of civil rules and regulations.48 It is
surely no accident that Roe v. Wade49 and Griswold arose as challenges to criminal statutes. And the most widespread form of substantive due process is one that has been applied almost exclusively
to criminal statutes: through void-for-vagueness doctrine, the
courts have invalidated a whole generation of vagrancy and loitering statutes and have struck down a variety of other laws that
criminalized seemingly innocuous conduct.so Substantive review
outside criminal law is a good deal rarer, and more threatening: it
harks back to a time when the courts regularly second-guessed legislative judgments about regulatory matters.
43, and Boyd applied the Fifth Amendment to a subpoena for customs invoices. See 116 U.S.
at 617-18.
47. Though this system of judge-made constitutional criminal procedure rules is generally
taken for granted, it has generated some severe criticism. See CRAio M. BRADLEY, THE
FAILURE OF THE CR!MJNAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION (1993).
48. For a pair of familiar examples (one old and one new), see Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962) (invalidating a statute that criminalized drug addiction), and R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (invalidating a criminal "hate speech" ordinance).
49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
50. The key cases invalidating vagrancy and loitering laws are Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); and Palmer v.
Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971). For a more modem version of the problem, see Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (invalidating a statute requiring individuals to produce credible
identification to police on demand). For the best discussion of these cases in the literature,
see John C. Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L.
REv. 189 (1985).
Often vagueness cases have had First Amendment overtones. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen,
415 U.S. 566 (1974) (invalidating a flag desecration statute on vagueness grounds); Note, The
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960). But that
has not always been the case. The problems with vagrancy and loitering statutes went far
beyond speech issues, and the statutes themselves covered a great deal of ordinary (nonspeech) street conduct. See Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-'JYpe Law and iJs Administration, 104 U.
PA. L. REv. 603 (1956). That seems to have been the key to their invalidation: vagrancy and
loitering statutes allowed criminal arrest and punishment of ordinary citizens for ordinary
conduct, which in practice meant punishment for invidious reasons. That is why I refer to
these cases as a form of substantive due process - because the courts have essentially imposed substantive limits on what counts as a crime. For a similar argument, see Robert C.
Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 CAL. L. REV. 491
(1994).
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In short, rules governing police practices have substantive ef~
fects, both inside and outside criminal law. Privacy-based limits
have different substantive effects than other kinds of limits. None
of this is problematic unless the substantive effects are themselves
problematic. And that's the rub: some ways of regulating law enforcement affect the scope of ordinary criminal law but not much
else. Other methods of reining in the police have much broader
substantive implications. Privacy-based rules, it turns out, are in the
latter camp.

C. Privacy's Problem
Law enforcement, civil or criminal, depends on information.
That information is often "private" in the sense that it rests in the
hands of someone who would like it kept secret. This description
fits almost all incriminating evidence in the hands of a criminal defendant, information that sometimes cannot be extracted due to the
Fifth Amendment. Much of the information the system needs is
also "private" in a more meaningful sense. It is of a type that many
people, not just a particular litigant, might care about keeping secret. A cocaine dealer may be convicted because of drugs found in
his bedroom closet; even those who comply with the drug laws wish
to keep people out of their bedroom closets. A fraud conviction
may depend on evidence of a large bank deposit on a given date;
even wholly honest citizens value the secrecy of their bank
transactions.
Fourth Amendment law purports to protect most information
that is private in this second sense. Unless the police have a facially
valid warrant or sufficient cause together with a valid exception to
the warrant requirement, they may not search for evidence in
places that are both (i) hidden from public view and (ii) likely to
contain the sorts of things that ordinary people wish to keep to
themselves. This basic formula is well established. For example, in
Oliver v. United States, 51 the Supreme Court held that searches of
"open fields" - basically, large tracts of land that are not too close
to a house - are not regulated by the Fourth Amendment because
large, open tracts of land do not usually house things that their
owners wish to keep secret.52 On the other hand,"in United States v.
51. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
52. "[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance. There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that
occur in open fields." 466 U.S. at 179. On the requirement that the place being searched be
hidden from public view, see supra note 21.
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Karo, 53 the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does limit ef-

forts to monitor the movement of things or people inside houses,
because houses, unlike fields, do contain things that most people
want to keep to themselves.s4
If one starts with this definition of private, protecting private
information outside the criminal context would have huge substantive effects, especially if the information is protected absolutely without any provision for disclosure in response to a showing of
relevance or need or cause. Some criminal litigation may not depend on compelled disclosure of private material. In an ordinary
robbery case, all the testimony may be consensual and all the physical evidence may have been gathered with the cooperation of the
victim. But in any system that seeks to do more than pro forma
regulation of business or finance or that tries to police the distribu·tion of guns or drugs, absolute protection of private information is
unacceptable unless private is defined so narrowly as to make the
enterprise pointless. Much criminal law enforcement, and an even
larger category of civil regulation, would be impossible.
The short-lived regime of Boyd v. United Statesss illustrates this
proposition. Boyd held, basically, that the government could not
obtain documents in the possession of their legitimate owner - not
through search and seizure, not through subpoena, not through the
testimony of the documents' owner.56 All routes were barred: the
documents were absolutely protected by the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. The year after Boyd was decided, Congress passed
the Interstate Commerce Act.57 Antitrust and bankruptcy legislation followed shortly thereafter.ss Before long, railroad officials
were raising constitutional objections to ICC investigations,s9 debt53. 468 U.S. 705 {1984).
54. 468 U.S. at 713-18.
55. 116 U.S. 616 {1886).
56. The documents in question were customs invoices, and they were subpoenaed in a
civil forfeiture proceeding. 116 U.S: at 618. Early in its opinion the Court concluded that the
subpoena should be treated no differently than a search. 116 U.S. at 621-22. In the course of
discussing whether this "search" was constitutionally unreasonable, the Court declared that it
was no different than compelled testimony, which would obviously be barred by the Fifth
Amendment. 116 U.S. at 633. Thus, where Boyd applied, the means by which the govern·
ment obtained the evidence apparently did not matter: searches, subpoenas, and oral testimony alike were barred.
57. 24 Stat. 379 {1887} {codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
58. The Sherman Antitrust Act was passed three years after the ICA. Sherman Act, ch.
647, 26 Stat. 209 {1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 {1988)). Federal bankruptcy
legislation was passed eight years later. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544
(repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 {1988)).
59. See, e.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 {1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547 (1892).
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ors were seeking to bar production of documents in bankruptcy
proceedings,60 and antitrust violators were trying to use the privilege to shield themselves from liability.61 The Supreme Court
shortly concluded that if it took Boyd seriously, government regula.:.
tion would be impossible.62 That was the beginning of the end of
Boyd. The Court created a series of arbitrary "outs" from the protection, sometimes explicitly acknowledging that it was doing so in
order to avoid disabling the government from pursuing various
kinds of socially useful regulation.63
Boyd's troubled history shows that absolute protection for any
substantial class of private information is incompatible with a lot of
government activity.64 That raises an obvious question: How can
the system constitutionally protect private information without
casting such a large substantive shadow? The answer seems easy:
relax the protection. Privacy can be protected but not absolutely;
given some form of balancing, it should be possible to shield individual privacy interests without endangering the modem state's
ability to regulate. But balancing does not remove the substantive
shadow. Balancing only transforms a flat prohibition into openended substantive judicial review.
Consider how balancing might work. It seems initially plausible
to suppose that if one weighs the individuai's interest in keeping
things private against the state's interest in disclosure, one can protect most of what Boyd protected while still allowing the government to do its job. The obvious mechanism is some kind of "need"
requirement - a regime that forces the government to show that it
has a good reason for wanting the stuff, good enough to outweigh
the individual's privacy interest. That is what the probable cause
and rea~onable suspicion standards in Fourth Amendment law are
ostensibly about. Those standards say that the police cannot inspect the contents of the glove compartment of my car just because
60. See, e.g., In re Harris, 164 F. 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1908), affd. 190 F. 1018 (2d Cir. 1911); In
re Hess, 134 F. 109 (E.D. Pa. 1905); Potter v. Beal, 49 F. 793 (C.C.D. Mass. 1892). In one of
his earliest opinions, Judge Learned Hand held that a bankrupt had waived any self-incrimination claim he might make when he turned his books over to the receiver without objection.
In re Tracy & Co., 177 F. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1910).
61. See, e.g., In re Hale, 139 F. 496 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1905), affd. sub nom Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43 (1906).
62. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906).
63. See infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
64. One might argue that our system has always protected some pockets of private information through evidentiary privileges outside of the Fifth Amendment. But that sort of privacy protection is different because it protects information that has already been disclosed.
In other words, evidentiary privileges encourage disclosure in certain relationships rather
than protecting private information against disclosure.
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some officer wants to look, but the police can look if they have
good reason to believe the glove compartment contains something
that suggests criminal behavior. The government's interest in
stamping out crime justifies the search, but only if it can show why,
ex ante, the search is likely to advance that interest. My privacy
seems to be protected, and the government's ability to punish
crimes seems only trivially impaired.
Unfortunately, requiring something akin to probable cause or
reasonable suspicion is often impractical. The government needs
certain kinds of information from taxpayers in order to enforce the
tax laws. It cannot require disclosure only in cases in which it has
some basis for suspecting a violation, because then it could not uncover violations. If the government must show case-by-case need
for the information, it must recast the tax laws so that such information is not important. Privacy protection would act as a substantive
prohibition. So too with OSHA inspections, or inspections to enforce building and fire codes, or record-keeping requirements attendant to affirmative action decrees, or proxy statements that must
be filed with the SEC. In all these areas, the type of regulation that
the government seeks to perform is impossible without compelled
"suspicionless" disclosure - disclosure that precedes any showing
that the government has a strong interest in obtaining the information in this case.
Balancing is still possible in such cases, but it looks a lot like
open-ended review of the reasonableness of the government's regulatory regime. Even when suspicionless review is necessary for the
particular regulatory regime, the government has an interest, perhaps a strong interest, in getting the information. But that interest
is different from the interest in finding out the contents of my glove
compartment. The government's "need" argument in the'se typical
regulatory settings is not the need to engage in this particular
search. Rather, the relevant government interest is the interest in
having the regulatory regime. The real claim is that without the
power to get this information, the government cannot have these
tax code provisions, or these OSHA regulations, or these affirmative action orders, or these securities rules.
That claim does not do away with balancing. It just moves the
balance to a higher level of generality: Is this regulation important
enough to justify the invasion of privacy required to enforce it?
Take, for example, a fairly routine item on an individual tax form.
One who claims a charitable deduction of noncash property must
report the name of the charity to which the property was given if
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the property's value exceeds five hundred dollars.6s Tax forms require many disclosures of this sort, usually as a means of increasing
compliance with the law. The disclosure of the name of the donee
is not necessary in order to have the underlying revenue rules: it is
not like the requirement that gross income be stated. But it is a
useful means of reducing fraudulent deductions. Indeed, until a
couple of years ago, the same requirement applied to cash donations of over three thousand dollars in any_ one year to a single
recipient.66
This information is undoubtedly private in any ordinary sense of
the word, and it more than exceeds the Fourth Amendment privacy
threshold. The objects of my charity are much more sensitive than
the usual contents of my glove compartment, and the latter are protected against unreasonable searches. Meanwhile, a probable cause
or reasonable suspicion requirement, the usual response of Fourth
Amendment law to threatened privacy interests, would be unworkable in this context. Disclosure_ must. be required across the board
or it is useless. Thus constitutional balancing, Fourth Amendment
style, would have to look something like the following: On one side
is the interest in secrecy of all those who must tell the IRS the
names of their favorite charities. On the other side is the government's interest in having the disclosure rule. Though the latter interest may not be trivial, it is hardly overwhelming. The
government could structure the rules in ways that required less disclosure, or it could abandon the requirement altogether and simply
live with some additional noncompliance. Neither possibility is unthinkable. How substantial is taxpayers' "interest in secrecy? It is
hard to say, but this privacy interest is surely at least as strong as
the interest in the sanctity of glove compartments and lunch bags
and jacket pockets - all areas where Fourth Amendment law protects individuals' interest in nondisclosure.
The result of the weighing process may not be absolutely clear.
But the nature of the process should be transparent: it is reasonableness review of ordinary regulatory legislation. If the privacy interest is substantial, and in Fourth Amendment terms it plainly is,
the tax rule would be upheld only if the government's interest was
at least as strong. The weight given the government's interest
would be a question for the courts, not for Congress or the IRS, just
as courts, and not the police, determine how much weight to attach
65. Schedule A, I.R.S. Form 1040, at 1.14 (1993). The name of the organization must be
reported on Form 8283, line 1, column (a).
66. See I.R.S. Form 1040, Schedule A, at line 14 (1989).
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to law enforcement needs when deciding whether particular
searches and seizures are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. A court striking this balance would have to decide whether
the government had a good reason, not just a rational basis, for
requiring disclosure of this information in this way instead of adopting some other regulatory path.67 In other words, the court would
have to engage in open-ended, nondeferential substantive review of
the relevant rule.
That, in a nutshell, is the substantive problem with protecting
the kinds of privacy interests we claim to protect in search and
seizure cases. Wherever the regulatory state engages in any form of
compelled information gathering (and it does so everywhere), there
is an enormous cost to taking privacy interests seriously: doing so
requires judicial judgments about whether one regulatory path is
more reasonable than another. That sounds uncomfortably close to
the regime that the Supreme Court sought to bury a half-century
ago.

D. Solutions That Don't Work
Judges are not about to start invalidating commonplace items on
tax forms on Fourth Amendment grounds. Nor should they. But
explaining why not turns out to be hard, given that the system protects much weaker privacy interests against invasion by the police.
The only principled way to avoid unacceptable outcomes is to find
ways to distinguish the kinds of privacy intrusions police inflict on
criminal suspects from the kinds of intrusions that civil regulatory
regimes inflict on their targets - in order to justify regulating the
former quite carefully while leaving the latter pretty much alone.
67. In an interesting and insightful recent article, Scott Sundby argues that the very pervasiveness of privacy intrusions in the regulatory state might tend to skew this balance: the
more regularly privacy is infringed, the less important it seems when weighed against the
government's interests. Sundby, supra note 4, at 1760-61. Arguably the same thing is true on
the criminal procedure side. The kinds of technological advances that make privacy intrusions both possible and more common tend to undermine the importance of the privacy
interest in the law of search and seizure. Id. at 1761-63.
These points are correct: privacy protection has declined in important ways within criminal procedure, and it has almost disappeared elsewhere. But the law has not simply abandoned the interest in keeping secrets. Rather, that interest has been preserved but within a
narrowed sphere. To put it another way, different perspectives lead to different conclusions
about the degree to which privacy is still protected in Fourth Amendment law. If one compares the current regime to, say, the rule in Boyd, one is struck by how little privacy protection remains. On the other hand, if one compares current search and seizure law to the law
(such as it is) that governs information gathering outside the context of ordinary criminal
investigation, the surprising thing is how much Fourth Amendment law protects privacy in
run-of-the-mill criminal cases. My aim is to explore the latter comparison, and thereby to get
a better sense of the law's inconsistencies.
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And several possible separating mechanisms exist. In fact, the law
has embraced most of them at one time or another. Unfortunately,
none of them works.

1. Categorical Balancing
Perhaps privacy interests are protected as much outside the
sphere of criminal investigation as inside that sphere. The government may have more leeway with tax forms than with drug busts
because it has a stronger interest in collecting taxes than in enforcing the drug laws, or because the relevant privacy interests are
weaker in the tax context. Perhaps balancing takes place in both
areas, but in regulatory settings the government's side of the scale is
always heavier.
The argument is tempting, but wrong. The strength of the government's interest in any particular regulatory regime is, to put it
mildly, highly contestable. That, after all, is why judicial review of
the sort embodied by Lochner v. New York6B was such a problem.
Moreover, in a consistent privacy-protective system the government
would typically have to defend not the tax code as a whole, but only
the particular feature of it that caused the relevant privacy invasion.
No court would need to choose between privacy protection and the
tax code or OSHA, for the relevant tax or safety rules could always
be recast to require less disclosure. Remember that the IRS need
not require the charitable contribution disclosure mentioned above:
it could always keep the deduction, abandon the disclosure requirement, and live with a little more noncompliance. It is very hard to
imagine that the government's interest in particular regulatory rules
- rules like the charitable contribution disclosure requirement is always so strong, across the board, that it outweighs the harm to
privacy.
Indeed, one would think that the government's interest in most
criminal settings would be stronger than the parallel interests at
stake in tax disputes or OSHA investigations. Fourth and Fifth
Amendment law apply to murder and rape and robbery cases,
where the public interest in catching and punishing offenders is very
high indeed. Unless there is a huge disparity in privacy interests
running in the opposite direction, balancing should give the police
more leeway than civil regulators, not less.
Nor are privacy interests obviously stronger in criminal settings
than in civil ones. They may be weaker. Building inspections, tax
68. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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forms, searches of government employees' files - all these involve
more intrusion on privacy interests than searches of automobiles
and suitcases, not to mention lunch bags and jacket pockets. Of
course, there are some things police do that are more intrusive than
anything the government does outside the realm of criminal investigation. Wiretaps are a good example: OSHA does not intrude on
personal conversations. Searches of private homes may be another,
because the regulatory state does not require rummaging through
bedroom closets. But most police searches are not in houses and do
not involve electronic eavesdropping. With respect to the mass of
car searches and street stop-and-frisks, the informational privacy interest at stake does not seem any weightier than the taxpayer's interest in keeping secret the objects of his charity.
Thus, it is hard to see how any plausible balance of privacy interests and government need could yield both current levels of
Fourth Amendment protection and current levels of regulatory discretion. The interest in regulation is probably weaker than the interest in criminal law enforcement. Excluding house searches and
wiretaps, privacy interests are not obviously different in the two settings, or if they are, the difference cuts in the wrong direction. No
consistent regime would both protect privacy interests in briefcases
or trunks of cars or jacket pockets when the police wish to search
those places and also ignore privacy interests in the sorts of information the government wants in other settings.
2. Drawing Lines Between Individuals and Institutions
A good deal of what the regulatory state seeks to regulate is the
conduct of institutions: corporations, partnerships, labor unions,
and the like. These institutions, most people would say, do not
have the same sorts of privacy interests as individuals. A corporation may prefer that some piece of financial information remain secret in order to prevent competitors from copying its investment
successes, but this privacy interest is nothing more than the accumulated interests of the shareholders in maximizing the corporation's
value, coupled with the interests of employees and officers in keeping their jobs. Since the New Deal, constitutional law has not protected purely economic interests of this sort, at least not outside the
Takings Clause. And there is nothing irrational about a regime that
protects informational privacy only to the extent it causes some
noneconomic, intangible harm - harm of a sort that people, not
institutions, can feel.
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Current Fourth and Fifth Amendment law draws precisely this
line. Fourth Amendment law protects corporations, but only nominally.69 Meanwhile, the privilege against self-incrimination does
not apply to corporations (or other groups, for that matter) at an.10
This difference in treatment is perhaps an effort to protect individuals against privacy intrusions from the police without protecting institutions' interest in keeping regulation at bay.
'I\vo obstacles, however, prevent solving privacy's problem by
drawing lines between individuals and institutions. First, even if
one sets criminal investigation to one side, a great deal of government information gathering targets individuals. Tax forms are the
most obvious example. Searches of government employees by their
employers are another.71 A line between individuals and institutions may have saved the regulatory state at the tum of the century,
but the state's reach is surely too broad for that tactic to work now.
Second, even if harm to privacy is defined in purely dignitary
terms, privacy is something that individuals possess within institutions, not just outside them. When the government seeks to find
something out about the place where I work, the information it
seeks may embarrass me personally. If one is to protect privacy
consistently, that interest must receive the same weight as the interest in keeping secret the contents of my briefcase when I am
stopped on the street by a police officer. Yet if claims by individuals within institutions "count," the systei;n unravels; the effect is almost the same as giving the institution itself a protectible privacy
interest.
This point surfaces in a recent case involving the application of
the Fifth Amendment to corporate employees. Individuals may refuse to comply with a grand jury subpoena if the act of producing
the thing asked for would tend to incriminate them.72 Corporations
do not have this privilege, as the Court reaffirmed in Braswell v.
United States. 13 But under Braswell, corporate employees are
treated not like individuals (which is what they are), but like corporations. A corporate officer cannot refuse to produce corporate
69. For typical statements that businesses receive less Fourth Amendment protection
than individuals, see Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237-38 {1986), and
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981).
70. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 115-17 (1988).
71. Cf. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 {1987).
72. F!Sher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). For the best discussion of this doctrine,
see Robert P. Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amendment Seriously,
73 VA. L. REv. 1 {1987).
73. 487 U.S. 99 {1988).
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documents in his custody, even if the act of producing the documents would incriminate the officer personally.14 The officer's interest does not count for Fifth Amendment purposes as long as he
is acting as an officer. The rule that corporations are not covered
by the privilege cannot justify this result. The officer loses even if
he is trying to protect his own interest, not the corporation's. Yet if
the rule were otherwise, the system might not function. Documents
that incriminate the corporation also tend to incriminate individuals
within the corporation, so a privilege that covered Braswell might
not differ much from a privilege that covered his corporate
employer.75
Braswell shows why it will not do to say that privacy interests
can be protected for "individual" activities but not institutional
ones. Institutions consist of people, and people care about keeping
secrets. Privacy interests run through the whole of individuals'
lives, much of which is lived out within institutions. Even if the
Constitution protects only real persons and not artificial ones, serious privacy protection cannot avoid interfering with the business of
regulating institutions.
3.

The Search-Subpoena Line

There is a line in criminal procedure that might help resolve the
tension between privacy protection within the criminal sphere and
its absence without. Although police searches are subject to probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards and sometimes to a
warrant requirement, grand jury subpoenas are much less heavily
regulated. As long as the material asked for is relevant to the grand
jury's investigation and as long as compliance with the subpoena is
not too burdensome, the subpoena is enforced. No showing of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion is necessary, and courts
measure relevance and burden with a heavy thumb on the government's side of the scales.76
74. 487 U.S. at 109-17. The employee does receive partial immunity: in any subsequent
criminal prosecution of the employee, the government may not introduce into evidence the
fact that the employee personally produced the corporate documents. 487 U.S. at 117-18.
Notwithstanding this partial immunity, the government gains enormously from the employee's act of production. The government may use both the documents themselves and
evidence of the corporation's act of production against the employee, even in cases, like
Braswell, in which the corporation is wholly owned and administered by the individual claiming the privilege.
75. For an elaboration of this point, see Wtlliam J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse,
88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1279-80 (1988).
76. SARA SUN BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAw & PRAcnCB §§ 6:09,
6:26-27 (1986); 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIOHr, FEDERAL PRAcnCB AND PROCEDURE §§ 274-75
(1982).
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The law's different treatment of searches and subpoenas might
stem from a kind of overbreadth problem. When the police search
a car, they see anything that happens to be in the car, not just guns
or drugs. A subpoena, on the other hand, asks only for the evidence being sought; nothing else need be disclosed. This difference
could suggest that searches by their very nature invade privacy
more than subpoenas do. To play out the argument, government
information gathering in the civil sphere might resemble subpoenas
and not searches. Tax forms, after all, ask only for the information
the government needs under the tax laws, not for generalized financial disclosure. If the pattern holds elsewhere, the conflict between
privacy protection in criminal procedure and its absence elsewhere
might be only apparent.
This argument has two serious flaws. First, a great deal of regulatory information gathering does not conform to the subpoena
model. OSHA and EPA not only subpoena documents, they search
targets' businesses as well.77 Government employers search employees' desks and file cabinets;1s school principals search students'
lockers.79 There is no privacy-based reason for treating these
searches differently from police searches; the overbreadth phenomenon is the same in both settings. Even if the line between searches
and subpoenas makes sense in privacy terms, it can only reduce privacy's substantive shadow, not eliminate it.
The second flaw is more fundamental: the line is incoherent in
privacy terms. The Boyd Court understood this - the Justices applied the full force of Fourth and Fifth Amendment protection to a
subpoena for customs invoices - and nothing since Boyd has undermined its reasoning. The relevant privacy interest is the interest
in keeping secret whatever the government is examining. The problem with a typical search is that the government's agent is examining whatever happens to be there, not just guns or cocaine. There
may be no legitimate interest in keeping the guns or cocaine secret,so but the officer sees innocent (albeit potentially embarrassing) things as well. Hence the overbreadth concern. But subpoenas
do not do away with this problem unless they seek only "guilty"
information - which they don't. Subpoenas for :financial records
77. See, e.g., Donovan v. Masher Steel Corp., 791F.2d1535 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1030 (1987); Hartford Assoc. v. United States, 792 F. Supp. 358 (D.N.J. 1992);
Pieper v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 94 (D. Minn. 1978), affd., 604 F.2d 1131 (8th Cir. 1979).
78. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
·
79. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363 (Mass. 1992).
80. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth
Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1229 (1983).
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or correspondence are common, and these documents can include a
great deal of legitimately private information. Just as the police officer must search the whole car to find the hidden cocaine, the subpoena must demand a great deal of innocent-but-private material in
order to turn up the "smoking gun" document.
And much more than in criminal investigations, the information
the government seeks in civil settings tends to be "innocent" rather
than "guilty." The charitable contribution disclosure is a good example. Indeed, in any across-the-board disclosure regime, most of
the disclosure is about legitimate conduct. A great many law-abiding taxpayers must disclose a great deal about their finances in order to help catch a few frauds. For privacy purposes, this
information should count just as much as the innocent information
the government discovers when searching the trunk of a car for
drugs. The overbreadth concern is real, but it does not justify any
sharp line between the criminal justice system and the regulatory
state. On the contrary, it suggests that privacy protection within the
criminal justice system is seriously incomplete.
4.

The Right-Privilege Distinction

Let us return to the example of charitable deductions and disclosure of the identity of the donee. The government might argue
that the privacy objection to this required disclosure is wholly misguided, because the taxpayer need not disclose anything. If he does
not want to share the information, he does not have to claim the
deduction. Disclosure is required only as a condition to the receipt
of money back from the government - only as a "string" attached
to a government "gift." The police invade privacy differently. Police officers who search people's cars are not granting favors; they
are forcibly intruding on citizens' lives.
This argument requires one to adopt a very strong version of the
right-privilege distinction.81 In the charitable deduction example, it
requires that one treat the money as belonging to the government,
which then bestows deductions as a matter of grace on whatever
conditions it chooses. But in a regime with such a strong right-privilege distinction, privacy could not be protected in either the criminal or civil spheres. The state lic.enses cars and drivers, and it builds
the roads they use. The state might grant permission to drive on its
roads only in return for permission to search automobiles as its po81. A much stronger version than our system has adopted, at least for the past generation. See Wtlliam W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in ConstitutU:mal Law, 81 liARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
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lice forces wish, with or without probable cause. This position is as
plausible, or implausible, as the claim that the government can require otherwise private information from taxpayers as a condition
of granting tax deductions.
Yet courts would not think of buying the argument for suspicionless car searches.82 The response would be that whatever
power such arguments have, it is too late in the day to regard every
potential greater government power as authorizing any exercise of
supposedly lesser authority. The same point must hold true for
taxes and licensing requirements and the many other regulatory settings in which the government both bestows benefits and requires
disclosure. Whatever view of the right-privilege distinction one
takes, that distinction cannot separate the criminal sphere from
everything else.
5. Separating Disclosure to the Government From Disclosure to
the Public
One might plausibly say that telling the IRS who receives my
charitable contributions does not really intrude on my privacy very
much. After all, my friends and neighbors and co-workers do not
know; the only people who have the information are a few government employees who have no contact with me, do not know or care
who I am, and are under strict orders not to spread such information around. Perhaps one need not take privacy interests very seriously in regulatory contexts because those interests are not
seriously infringed.
This is a substantial argument. The harm that stems from the
discovery of secrets depends on who does the discovering, and on
whether the information is subsequently spread.83 And a great deal
of compelled information gathering occurs in ways that ensure that
82. The Supreme Court has recognized the states' "pervasive regulation" of automobiles
as a justification for lesser Fourth Amendment protection. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106,
113 (1986) (holding that a car owner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle
identification number, which by law must be visible from outside the car). But lesser protection does not mean no protection. 475 U.S. at 112 ("A citizen does not surrender all the
protections of the Fourth Amendment by entering an automobile."). The police must have
reasonable suspicion in order to stop a car other than as part of a roadblock, Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979), and must have probable cause (although not a warrant) in
order to search it, see, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Thus, the police are
subject to substantial constitutional restrictions when searching cars and cannot evade those
restrictions by citing the state's sweeping regulatory authority.
83. For a pair of rare acknowledgments of this point in· the literature, see Seth F.
Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure
in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1991) and Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data
Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 ThxAs L. REV. - (1995).
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the information stays secret vis-a-vis the public. Indeed, the federal
Privacy Act84 often requires as much. As long as the handling of
the information is carefully policed - as long as the IRS cannot
leak the contents of particular tax returns - the system can both
protect privacy and require disclosure of a great deal of private
information.
But while it makes sense to discriminate among different kinds
of compelled disclosure on the basis of who receives the information, that does not solve the problem with constitutional protection
of privacy interests. After all, the argument applies as much to the
police as to the IRS. A police officer searching my briefcase will
not necessarily tell anyone what he finds as long as he does not find
evidence of crime. And if publicizing innocent personal information is the harm the law protects against, the law should regulate
police behavior after a search much more severely than it now
does.85 Indeed, if public disclosure, as opposed to disclosure to the
government, is what the Constitution guards against, Fourth
Amendment law should be wholly reoriented. It should restrict police searches a good deal less than it now does, and it should restrict
post-search police behavior much more. Such a regime would
largely do away with privacy-based restrictions on police evidence
gathering: it would make the law governing the police more like
the law that now governs the IRS, not the other way around. Distinguishing between public disclosure and disclosure to the government offers no means of reconciling criminal procedure's protection
of privacy with the lax approach taken outside the criminal sphere.
Instead, it suggests that the kind of privacy protection the criminal
procedure system purports to provide is mostly misguided.
6. Privacy as a Remedy, Not a Right
Suppose the main point of the constitutional law regulating the
police were to limit the use of coercion and violence in law enforcement.86 One might still see courts paying a great deal of attention
to what police officers saw, heard, and found, as long as the dominant remedy for police misconduct was the exclusionary rule. The
law might appear to be protecting privacy, but it would actually be
84. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988):
85. Currently, such regulation is left to state and local law and custom. See Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
86. As I argue infra in Part Ill it should be.
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using the threat of the suppression remedy to protect something
very different. Privacy protection would be a remedy, not a right.87
Perhaps this account describes the current system. That would
explain the inconsistency with which privacy is protected in criminal
procedure. It might also explain why constitutional law treats police searches so differently from other kinds of government information gathering.
This line of argument may be the strongest response to the claim
that criminal procedure is out of sync with the rest of constitutional
law. Current Fourth Amendment law does tend to protect privacy
primarily where there is some danger of police coercion, which suggests that privacy language could be a screen for something else.
Yet when police coercion is a potential problem, the law still protects privacy, not the freedom from unreasonable coercion. The focus is still on what the police officer saw and what justification he
had for seeing it, not on how much force he used and whether it was
reasonable under the circumstances. The Supreme Court penalizes
an officer for turning over a stereo turntable to look at a serial
number without sufficient cause,ss but the same Court ignores unprovoked police violence during the course of an otherwise legal
search of a private home.89 The law requires more of a justification
for searching a suspect's pockets than for grabbing him, spinning
him around, and shoving him against the wall of a building.90
To be sure, Fourth Amendment law sometimes does focus directly on the level of police coercion. Tennessee v. Gamer,91 the
case that established Fourth Amendment limits on police use of
deadly force, is a prime example. But cases like Gamer are telling
precisely because they are so rare. For every reported decision discussing the law of deadly force, dozens discuss the rules that govern
automobile searches.92 And amazingly, there is virtually no case
law governing the use of nondeadly force. 93 No one knows what
fr!. This is essentially the argument Professor Seidman makes elsewhere in this issue. See
Louis Michael Seidman, The Problem with Privacy's Problem, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1079, 108692 (1995).
88. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
89. See infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text (discussing Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635 (1987)).
90. See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
91. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
92. Compare 2 LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 5.l(d), and cases cited therein (discussing
deadly force claims) with 3 LAFAVE, supra note 29, §§ 7.1-7.5, and cases cited therein (discussing various sorts of automobile searches).
93. Tue law of police use of nondeadly force consists of the requirement that the force be
constitutionally reasonable under all the circumstances. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
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the Fourth Amendment requires before an officer strikes a suspect
because courts do not discuss the issue - they are too busy discussing the terms under which officers can open paper bags found in
cars.94 Coercion becomes the law's focus only in cases like Gamer
- that is, only in the most extreme cases. Elsewhere, the law's
chief concern remains privacy.
In other words, privacy protection is more than just a remedy in
criminal procedure; it is the heart of the liability rule. For the most
part, the law does not suppress evidence when the police have behaved too coercively. It suppresses evidence when the police have
seen and heard things they were not supposed to see and hear. Coercion matters in the law of criminal procedure, but privacy matters
more. That is the heart of the conflict: in criminal procedure, the
law worries a great deal about what the government is and is not
supposed to see; elsewhere, the government can see just about anything it wants.

7. Representation Reinforcement
Last but certainly not least, one might argue that privacy should
be protected in criminal procedure because criminal suspects cannot protect their own interests through the political process. If the
Constitution does not protect the privacy interests of this disadvantaged class, those interests will receive no protection at all. The
regulatory state's targets are situated differently. They are, broadly
speaking, more than able to guard their interests through political
means, so constitutional (read: judicial) protection matters a lot
less. On this account, there is no inconsistency to explain. Consti386, 396-99 (1989). The Court in Graham does not define this standard, except to say that it
is objective - the police officer's good or bad faith is beside the point, 490 U.S. at 397 - and
that
its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each
particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.
490 U.S. at 396. One searches in vain for any body of case law that gives this standard some
content. Cf. Rowland v. Perry, 41F.3d167, 173·74 (4th Cir. 1994) (reasoning that nondeadly
use of force should be proportional to the crime involved).
Of course, the exclusionary rule has something to do with this: by focusing attention on
the illegal discovery of evidence, it tends to focus the law's protection on privacy. See infra
notes 201-03 and accompanying text. But the exclusionary rule does not dictate the degree to
which the law focuses on privacy. Courts could, after all, suppress evidence in house search
cases when the entry was legal but the search was carried out too violently or with needless
humiliation to the occupants. So far as I am aware {and so far as anyone in the literature has
noticed), they never do so.
94. See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) {discussed infra at notes 170-75 and
accompanying text).
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tutional law protects privacy when it needs to and ignores privacy
when it can.
This line of argument is powerful, but ultimately unsatisfying. It
is. powerful because the criminal justice system does indeed have
class and race biases. Poor people and black people are more likely
to be caught in its web than middle- or upper-class whites.9s That
gives rise to a classic Carolene Products96 argument for special constitutional scrutiny. John Hart Ely made exactly that argument
when justifying constitutional search and seizure law in political
process terms, calling the Fourth Amendment a "harbinger of the
Equal Protection Clause" and noting the "tremendous potential for
the arbitrary or invidious infliction of 'unusually' severe punishments on persons of various classes other than 'our own.' "97 On
the other side of the fence, the classes of people most affected by
the regulatory state do seem to have at least their share of political
clout, so that one must stretch to make process arguments for special judicial protection for, say, taxpayers or the targets of EPA
investigations.
But the argument does not go far enough. In order to justify
remedying the inadequate privacy protection afforded criminal suspects, one must first show that the protection offered by the political process is inadequate. Here as elsewhere, Ely's argument
requires a substantive hook, a judgment that there is a problem
worth fixing. In order to justify the phenomenon at issue here, that
problem must be tied to privacy, to the interest in keeping secrets
from the government.
This is where the political process argument runs into trouble.
Fourth and Fifth Amendment law do not simply replicate the pri95. The high percentage of defendants whose indigence qualifies them for appointed
counsel shows how disproportionately poor criminal defendants are. See, e.g., Richard Klein,
The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 lND. LJ. 363, 379 n.102 (1993) (noting that "[e]ighty-five percent of
criminal defendants in the District of Columbia financially qualify for court-appointed counsel"); Jeffrey R. Rutherford, Comment, Dziubak v. Mott and the Need to Better Balance the
Interests ofthe Indigent Accused and Public Defenders, 78 MINN. L. REv. 977, 987 n.48 (1994)
(noting that the comparable figure for the two most populous counties in Minnesota is eighty
percent). See also Andy Court, Is There A Crisis?, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 46 (estimating eighty percent of defendants nationwide are indigent).
For evidence that the target of police officers' and prosecutors' attention are disproportionately black, see U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, STATISTICAL .ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 198 (113th ed. 1993); Douglas A. Smith et al., Equity and Discretionary Justice: The
Influence of Race on Police Arrest Decisions, 75 J. CruM. L. & CruM!NoLOGY 234 {1984);
Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1472, 1495-96
(1988).
96. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 {1938).
97. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 97 (1980).
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vacy protection that people receive from the regulatory state. On
the contrary, Fourth and Fifth Amendment law seems to give criminal suspects more privacy protection than ordinary citizens get from
government employers, tax collection agencies, and the like. This is
the puzzle that needs explaining: informational privacy is taken
much more seriously when the police search drug suspects than
when localities enforce building codes or the IRS audits tax returns.
Constitutional law is not bringing the politically powerless up to the
level of the powerful; in this limited sense, the powerless do better.
This phenomenon is not just a function of the different consequences of civil regulation and criminal law enforcement. Those
subject to police searches often go to jail, while the risks run by
regulated actors are usually less serious. But this has nothing to do
with privacy protection. When criminal defendants go to jail they
do so not becau~e they were searched (except in the most artificial
sense), but because they were found guilty of criminal offenses.98
Indeed, Fourth Amendment law gives no weight to the privacy interest in evidence of crime;99 privacy protection focuses on the interests of those who are not charged and convicted, not those who are.
Nor does the gap in privacy protection make sense as a response
to other kinds of police misconduct. One might make a very good
process theory argument for constitutional regulation of the police,
but it does not follow that that regulation should focus on privacy.
The puzzle remains: privacy receives more protection in the realm
of criminal law enforcement than in the regulatory arena. Representation reinforcement cannot justify that state of affairs.
Indeed, nonconstitutional law - the law most subject to the
democratic process - does not seem to give much weight to the
interest in keeping secrets. Disclosure requirements abound.too
There are limits: for example, the Privacy Act101 severely restricts
official use of private information about individual citizens.102 But
as with the Privacy Act itself, those limits mostly bear on what can
be done with information once the government has it. The amount
of compelled disclosure remains enormous. Aside from limits on
98. For the best elaboration of this point, see John C. Jeffries, Jr., Damages for Constitu·
tional Violations: The Relation of Risk to Injury in Constitutional Torts, 15 VA. L. REv. 1461,
1474-76 (1989).
99. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
100. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 83, at 3-5 nn.2·4 and sources cited therein.
101. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988).
102. See generally 1 JUSTIN D. FRANKLIN & ROBERT F. BOUCHARD, GUIDEBOOK TO nm
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND l'RivACY Acrs §§ 2.01-.13 (2d ed. 1986).
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electronic eavesdropping103 and on the ability of government officials to spread information around once they get it, there are few
legal constraints on regulators' ability to demand information from
ordinary citizens. Either the political process never works - in
which case process theory falls apart - or we should take this as a
signal that criminal procedure's focus on privacy is misplaced.
Either way, the political process argument fails.

E. The Problem Revisited
In its guise as an interest in keeping secrets, privacy is a poor
separating mechanism: it does not distinguish what the police do
from what the rest of the government does. If the government is
everywhere, privacy intrusions are everywhere. If we take them seriously when the intruders wear police uniforms, we should presumably do so elsewhere. But taking privacy seriously means a great
deal of open-ended judicial balancing of privacy interests against
the government's regulatory needs. That is akin to turning "rational basis" review into "reasonableness" review and giving "reasonableness" a good deal of bite. And that is akin to what courts
did in the Lochner era.
This problem casts an interesting light on the typical academic
complaint about the law of criminal investigation. A large amount
of Fourth Amendment commentary attacks the basic hypocrisy
within the law of criminal procedure. The system takes privacy very
seriously in some settings - house searches, for example - but
offers almost no privacy protection in others, such as requests for
bank or phone records. The standard theme of this literature is that
the law should take house searches as a model, that it should abandon its hypocrisy by giving privacy substantial protection across the
board.104 Yet even if the critics' wishes were answered, a much
103. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
104. Much of the best Fourth Amendment literature takes the Supreme Court to task for
not applying the probable cause and warrant requirements more broadly. See, e.g., Craig M.
Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468 (1985); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 257 (1984).
House searches are the primary locus of the probable cause and warrant requirements indeed, house searches are almost the only searches left in which both those requirements
apply. See Craig M. Bradley, The Court's "1Wo Model" Approach to the Fourth Amendment:
Carpe Diem/, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1993) [hereinafter Bradley, Carpe Diem!j.
Therefore, this criticism amounts to an argument that house searches should be the model for
all of Fourth Amendment law.
Note too that almost all Fourth Amendment literature criticizes the Court for protecting
privacy too little. 1bis is one of the major themes of Professor LaFave's treatise. See, e.g., 1
LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 2.4(a) (open fields doctrine); 1 id. § 2.6(c) (1987 & Supp. 1995)
(searches of garbage left for pickup); 3 id. § 7.2(c) (1987 & Supp. 1995) (automobile
searches); 4 id. § 10.11 (1987 & Supp. 1995) (searches of public school students). It is also a
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larger and more serious conflict would appear: the different constitutional treatment of privacy in the criminal and civil spheres.
There is little point to resolving the smaller conflict unless the
larger on~ can be resolved as well. Indeed, the two may be closely
related. A major source of the conflicts within criminal procedure
may be the effort to avoid the more basic difficulty - the seeming
incompatibility of the modem administrative state and serious protection for informational privacy.
Perhaps that incompatibility should be resolved by protecting
privacy more, across the board. But this solution would involve a
huge cost to the current constitutional order; it would require revisiting the accommodation between law and politics that has served
for the past fifty years. Nor is this just a matter of costs. The fact
that informational privacy seems to count for so little outside criminal investigation may suggest that it counts for little in our collective preferences. The law's tolerance of privacy harms inflicted by
the regulatory state, inflicted on even (especially?) the politically
powerful, implies that keeping secrets from the government is not
as important a value as Fourth and Fifth Amendment rhetoric suggests. If we could start over, perhaps privacy would not receive
constitutional protection anywhere. The anomaly may be criminal
procedure, not the regulatory state.
II.

PruvACY'S PROBLEM AND FOURTH AND

FIFTH AMENDMENT LAW

Protecting people's ability to keep secrets tends to limit the government's substantive power. The law of criminal procedure has
long sought to protect people's ability to keep secrets, at least from
the government. It follows that one of two things must be, and
must have been, true: (i) criminal procedure must serve as a surrogate for substantive due process - a source of substantive limits on
government power - or (ii) criminal procedure must be filled with
arbitrary boundaries or rules that limit privacy protection in order
theme of the literature attacking limits on the scope of the warrant requirement. See, e.g.,
Bradley, Carpe Diem/, supra; Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 197 {1993); Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth
Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1 {1991). Finally, it is the main theme of the literature criti·
cizing the Court's "reasonable expectation of privacy" doctrine. See sources cited infra note
144. In all this literature the standard rule for house searches - the requirement that the
police have both probable cause and a warrant in order to justify the search - is taken,
either implicitly or explicitly, as the model to which the law should ordinarily conform. In
that sense, virtually all of the vast literature on the Fourth Amendment attacks the hypocrisy
mentioned in the text - the gap between the way privacy is protected in the home and the
way it is protected on the street.
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also to limit its substantive effects. The first was probably true of
the law a century ago, when the Supreme Court first linked privacy
with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The second is emphatically
true of the law today..
A. Privacy Protection in the Lochner Era10s
In Boyd v. United States, 106 the government sought to compel a
merchant to produce invoices on twenty-nine cases of imported
glass. The government claimed that Boyd had lied about the contents of the shipments in order to evade taxes. The proceeding was
civil and in rem; the penalty sought was forfeiture of the glass.107
The Supreme Court held that the subpoena for the invoices violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. (The Court read the two
amendments to mean essentially the same thing.10s) Its broad holding appeared to rule out both searches and subpoenas for documents, at least if the purpose of the subpoena was to use the
documents as evidence.109 Justice Bradley's majority opinion contained ringing declarations of the importance of constitutionally
protecting "the privacies of life" and the centrality of that mission
to Fourth and Fifth Amendment law; the opinion also linked that
mission to the protection of property rights.110 Interestingly, Brad105. For a more extended version of the discussion in this subsection, see William J.
Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE LJ. (forthcoming Nov.
1995).
106. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
107. 116 U.S. at 617-18.
108. Hence the famous line, "[i]n this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other." 116 U.S. at 630. Later in its opinion the Court elaborated on the
relationship:
We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two amendments. They
throw great light on each other. For the "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the
F'"tfth Amendment, and compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a witness against
himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as
to what is an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
116 U.S. at 633.
109. The thrust of the majority opinion was to analogize the subpoena in Boyd to the
search and seizure of John Entick's books and papers in the famous eighteenth-century case,
Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765) (discussed in 116 U.S. at 626-30). Thus,
Boyd's bar on the subpoena necessarily included a bar on a search for documents. Significantly, nothing in the Court's opinion suggests that subpoenas like the one in Boyd are permissible given a good enough government justification. The bar was absolute, not
conditional.
110.
The principles laid down in [Entick v. Carrington] affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then
before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the
part of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's home and the priva-
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ley's opinion found it rather easy to apply the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments in the civil case at hand. The Court concluded that all
suits for "penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission of
offences against the law, are of ... quasi-criminal nature," 111 which
was enough to bring them within the spirit of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, though not within the amendments' "literal
terms. " 112
Today, most constitutional law scholars ignore Boyd. Those
who teach and write about criminal procedure, on the other hand,
tend to treat the case as an icon. Its unfortunate 1inking of privacy
and property aside, Boyd is conventionally seen as the Miranda of
its day, a criminal procedure case that courageously protected the
rights (particularly the privacy rights) of individuals against the government. Its passing - essentially nothing in Boyd's holding is
good law anymore - is mourned as a sign of citizens' diminished
protection against an overly aggressive criminal justice system.113
Judging from the appellate case law of its day, however, Boyd
was more important for its effect on regulatory legislation than for
its impact on criminal justice. In the decades following the Court's
decision, few ordinary criminal investigations led to Boyd-type
claims, either in the form of challenges to subpoenas or as trespass
actions against officers.114 On the other hand, regulatory cases
were common. In a number of bankruptcy cases, the debtor sought
to avoid certain kinds of compelled disclosure. 115 Antitrust cases
began to crop up following the Sherman Act in 1890, with defendants raising Fifth Amendment objections to subpoenas or questioning.116 Railroad regulation disputes were especially numerous and
especially high-profile, with corporate officials striving to avoid tescies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never been
forfeited by his conviction of some public offence •...
116 U.S. at 630.
111. 116 U.S. at 634.
112. 116 U.S. at 633.
113. For the modem view of Boyd, see Robert S. Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: Self·
Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 21 UCLA L. REV. 343. (1979); Eric
Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REv. 869 (1985); and
Note, The Life and Tunes of Boyd v. United States (1886-1976), 16 MICH. L. REv. 184 {1977).
114. Among reported cases, the sole exceptions are fraud cases. See, e.g., United States
v. National Lead Co., 75 F. 94 (C.C.D.N.J. 1896) (refusing to force a defendant to produce his
books and records in a civil proceeding to recover funds fraudulently obtained).
115. See supra note 60.
116. The most famous of these was Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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tifying or producing documents in ICC proceedings.117 Indeed,
both of the 1890s decisions that defined Fifth Amendment immunity doctrine for the next seventy-five years, Counselman v. Hitchcock11B and Brown v. Walker, 119 were railroad regulation disputes.
These cases were not all resolved in the defendants' favor;
courts found ways to evade Boyd's seemingly absolute protection.120 But defendants won often ~mough, and the ability to compel people to testify and turn over records was important enough,
that some turn-of-the-century judges and Justices openly worried
that regulation would be impossible if Boyd's privacy protection
were given its full scope.121
The concern was well founded. Consider Boyle v. Smithman, 122
an 1892 Pennsylvania case that adopted Boyd-style reasoning,
though without citing Boyd, as the relevant law was state rather
than federal. Pennsylvania had a statute requiring persons in the
business of transporting and storing oil to keep records of how
much oil they had on hand, where it was stored, and so forth.
Boyle, a newspaper publisher, tried to force Smithman, an oil
merchant, to produce the required records.123 The court might
have ruled that only the government was entitled to enforce the
statute, but instead it found for Smithman on a much broader
ground: forcing Smithman to produce the relevant records would
117. Several of the railroad cases made it to the Supreme Court. See Interstate Commerce Commn. v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25 (1904); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Interstate
Commerce Commn. v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547
(1892). These cases constitute the bulk of the Court's Fourth and Fifth Amendment case law
in the two decades after Boyd.
118. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
119. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
120. For example, in In re Harris, 164 F. 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1908), the court held that the
debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding should tum over his books and papers to the trustee, and
if the government ever wished to use them as evidence in a criminal case, the debtor could
decide whether to invoke his privilege. 164 F. at 294. Harris makes an interesting pair with
In re Tracy & Co., 177 F. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1910), in which the recently appointed Judge Learned
Hand ruled that when the debtor already had turned over his books to the trustee, he had
thereby waived any privilege claim he might make.
121. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906) (noting that antitrust regulation would be
impossible if Boyd's protection applied to corporations); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. at 610
{"If ••• witnesses standing in Brown's position were at liberty to set up an immunity from
testifying, the enforcement of the Interstate Commerce law or other analogous acts .•• would
become impossible, since it is only from the mouths of those having knowledge of the inhib·
ited contracts that the facts can be ascertained."); United States v. Price, 96 F. 960, 962 (D.
Ky. 1899) (restricting the scope of defendant's Fifth Amendment immunity under the Interstate Commerce Act, and noting that if immunity were not so restricted, defendants would
find it easy to immunize themselves for wrongdoing by getting themselves investigated for
ICA violations).
122. 23 A. 397 {Pa. 1892).
123. 23 A. at 397.
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violate the privilege against self-incrimination because the statute
specified penalties for any defaults in record-keeping.124 In other
words, Smithman could not be compelled to disclose his records
because the records themselves might be inadequate, and if they
were, Smithman might have to pay a fine. This holding apparently
applied no matter what the nature of the proceeding or who asked
for the records. The documents in question were papers, they were
therefore private, they belonged to Smithman, and their disclosure
might subject him to regulatory penalties. That was that.
Boyle shows just what Boyd might have meant for the emerging
regulatory state. If people could not be forced to disclose records
because they may have violated a record-keeping requirement, the
government could not have record-keeping requirements, or at
least not meaningful ones. If requiring the keeping of records was
impermissible, a good deal of regulation would be, as a practical
matter, impermissible as well. Meanwhile, more direct disclosure
- asking someone to turn over documents in order to show
whether the suspect had violated some conduct regulation - was
barred by Boyd itself. Nor could the government get around this
restriction by searching for the documents instead of issuing a subpoena, because Boyd treated searches and subpoenas the same.
Compelling oral testimony could not work because it would violate
the privilege against self-incrimination. People like Boyd and
Smithman were, potentially, immune from a great deal of compelled disclosure, and consequently exempt from a great deal of
government regulation.
Had the cases continued along this path, Boyd might have come
to play much the same role in constitutional law, and perhaps the
same villain's role in constitutional theory, that Lochner v. New
York125 and its ilk came to play. Government regulation required
lots of information, and Boyd came dangerously close to giving regulated actors a blanket entitlement to nondisclosure. It is hard to
see how modem health, safety, environmental, or economic regulation would be possible in such a regime.
As it happened, the cases did not continue along Boyd's path.
Beginning in the first decade of this century, Boyd was effectively
cabined, so much so that its implications for the world outside criminal justice have been largely forgotten. Hale v. Henkel126 held that
124. 23 A. at 398.
125. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
126. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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corporations have no privilege against self-incrimination and receive only slight protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures.121 Marron v. United States128 held that instrumentalities of
crime could be seized without violating the Fourth or Fifth Amendments, and also that documents could be instrumentalities.1w Shapiro v. United States130 held that the privilege was not violated by
asking someone to produce "required records" - meaning any
records that the government ordered him to keep - no matter how
incriminating the records' contents might be. These cases left Boyd
largely inapplicable to the burgeoning world of government regulation. The records in Boyd itself were probably instrumentalities
under Marron, 131 and the documents sought in the various ICC
cases of the 1890s might well have been judged "required records"
by the standards used a half-century later.
The Court did not explain its position in these cases in privacy
terms. By and large, it justified the outcomes by political necessity.
Hale, which arose out of a grand jury investigation of antitrust violations, is the clearest example. The argument for a corporate privilege was strong: Wigmore, then the foremost expert on the
privilege's scope and meaning, thought it applied to corporations as
it did to individuals.132 That was the position the Court had taken
with respect to the Due Process Clause,133 and like that clause the
Fifth Amendment privilege applied to "any person." Moreover, the
privacy interest in corporate documents was at least as plausible as
Boyd's privacy interest in his invoices. Even if a corporation could
not "feel" privacy intrusions, its shareholders and employees could;
as with due process claims, corporate assertion of the privilege
against self-incrimination was a way of protecting the flesh-andblood people whose money and labor made the corporation run.
Hale rejected all these arguments in a peremptory paragraph, stat127. 201 U.S. at 69-70, 76.
128. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
129. 275 U.S. at 198-99. Marron all but nullified the decision in Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298 (1921), which arguably broadened Boyd to apply to all searches for evidence,
not merely those that involved testimony or documents. See Note, supra note 113, at 189-95.
130. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
131. The records at issue in Boyd were invoices, and the alleged wrong was misrepresentation for the purpose of evading import taxes on shipments of plate glass. See supra note 7.
The invoices were necessary to the commission of the wrong, which would seem to bring
them within Marron's scope
132. 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A

TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN 1'RIALs AT

CoMMoN LAW§ 2259, at 3116 (1904) (calling the issue "plain").

133. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
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ing that "the privilege claimed would practically nullify" the Sherman Act.134
In other words, Boyd-style privacy protection was not compatible with activist government, because government cannot be very
activist if it cannot force people to tell it things. Cases like Hale
resolved the conflict by yielding ground - preserving privacy protection, but only within boundaries that themselves had nothing
whatever to do with privacy. Privacy's substantive shadow was kept
within acceptable bounds, but only by fiat.
B. Privacy Protection Today

Part of the problem with Fourth and Fifth Amendment law at
the turn of this century stemmed from the absolute nature of
Boyd's protection. Under Boyd, wherever the Constitution protected privacy, the state simply could not go; the concept of balancing seems to have been foreign to the constitutional culture.135
Today, of course, balancing plays a central role in Fourth and Fifth
Amendment law. All of Fourth Amendment law is conventionally
said to represent a balance between law enforcement needs and individual interests, and the balancing is done explicitly in particular
cases.136 Balancing is less pervasive in Fifth Amendment law1 but
there too the courts sometimes weigh the government's regulatory
needs against individual interests in nondisclosure, as in the "required records" cases spawned by Shapiro. 131 The advent of balancing reduces Boyd's substantive bite because it allows courts to
take account of the government's interest in regulating. Were the
Hale issue to arise for the first time today, the Court might reason
that society has a strong interest in antitrust enforcement and that
134.
As the combination or conspiracies provided against by the Sherman Anti 'Ii:ust Act can
ordinarily be proved only by the testimony of parties thereto, in the person of their
agents or employes, the privilege claimed would practically nullify the whole act of Congress. Of what use would it be for the legislature to declare these combinations unlawful
if the judicial power may close the door of access to every available source of information upon the subject?
201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906). This quotation follows a passage that nicely anticipates Braswell v.
United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988), by raising the specter of corporate agents invoking the
privilege to protect other agents or their corporate principal. 201 U.S. at 69-70; see also supra
text accompanying notes 72-75 {discussing Braswell).
135. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 948-52 (1987).
136. See, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451-55 (1990); Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 619-21 (1989).
137. 335 U.S. 1 {1948). See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 458 {1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Bernard D. Meltzer, Privileges Against Self-Incrimination and
the Hit-and-Run Opinions, 1971 SUP. Cr. REV. 1, 16-25.
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such enforcement would not be possible in a world where corporations or their officers could claim the privilege with respect to corporate documents. Privacy would be protected, but conditionally.
Making the protection conditional, however, cannot solve the
problem. A police officer must have probable cause or consent
before he may inspect the trunk of my car for drugs. But the government can force me to disclose pretty much anything it wishes on
my tax forms. Consistent privacy protection, even if subject to interest balancing, could not reach these results. The lesson seems
clear. Any attempt to give the same weight to individuals' interest
in keeping the government from seeing things, across the board,
must end in one of two ways: either a great deal of ordinary government activity must be subject to searching judicial review, or privacy-based restrictions on police searches must be drastically
reduced. Neither alternative seems palatable.
So the law has followed the path Hale marked out: abandon
privacy where it might create difficulties outside ordinary criminal
procedure. The result is a body of Fourth and Fifth Amendment
law filled with strange twists and turns. Consider three examples:
the law that defines what a "search" is, the cases that deal with
searches by government officials other than the police, and the doctrines that regulate the use of subpoenas.
The definition of search matters a great deal because the Fourth
Amendment forbids only "unreasonable searches and seizures."
Given the laxity of nonconstitutional regulation, if a given police
tactic is neither a search nor a seizure, it is probably unregulated by
any law. The definition seems initially to take careful account of
privacy interests: a search is anything that invades a "reasonable
expectation of privacy." According to the cases, this standard
means that a search has taken place whenever a police officer looks
somewhere that is both hidden from the public and likely to contain
the sorts of things that many people would prefer be kept
private.138
That sounds sensible enough. But many of the cases contradict
the formula. According to the Supreme Court, the following police
tactics do not infringe a "reasonable expectation of privacy" and so
are constitutionally unregulated: police overflights of private property,139 searches of garbage after it has been left for pickup,140 "pen
138. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
139. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
140. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
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registers" that record phone numbers that individuals have called
from their own homes,141 and requests made to banks or other financial institutions for individual customers' financial records.142
On the other hand, if a police officer walks up to a suspect who is
holding a rolled-up paper bag, the officer cannot open the bag unless he has probable cause to believe it contains evidence of crime,
probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime, or
reasonable grounds for suspecting the bag contains a weapon.143 In
terms of ordinary privacy expectations and preferences, these results are strange. Contraband aside, the paper bag is likely to contain nothing more private than a sandwich. Garbage contains a
good deal more - tossed-out correspondence, for example. And it
is hard to dispute the private nature of the times and targets of
one's phone calls, not to mention the details of one's finances. The
literature makes precisely this point: consistent privacy protection
requires a much broader definition of Fourth Amendment searches
than the Court has adopted.144
There is a pattern to these cases. When the police gather information in ways that involve neither a confrontation nor a trespass,
they usually are exempt from Fourth Amendment regulation, no
matter how private the information they seek. But when a police
officer, acting as a police officer, confronts a citizen, the Fourth
Amendment will apply to almost anything the officer examines:
one famous case even deals with the search of a crumpled cigarette
141. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
142. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
143. Opening the bag would unquestionably be a Fourth Amendment "search." E.g.,
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (requiring probable cause but not a warrant to
justify the search of a paper bag found in a car). The police could undertake such a search
incident to a lawful arrest, but that in tum would require probable cause to justify the arrest.
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). If probable cause to arrest were based
on the contents of the bag - for example, if the police had probable cause to believe the bag
contained cocaine - that would justify both the arrest and the search. Alternatively, if the
police had probable cause to believe the bag contained evidence but lacked probable cause
to arrest (an unlikely scenario), they could seize and hold the bag while they applied for a
warrant to search it. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (criticizing the
government for not following this procedure). Fmally, if the police had reasonable grounds
for suspecting that the bag contained a weapon, that would justify a brief search that would
include the bag. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (authorizing frisks based on reasonable
suspicion of the presence of a weapon); cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983} (authorizing Terry frisk that extended beyond the suspect's person and included the suspect's car).
144. See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the 1Wenty-first Century, 65 IND. LJ. 549 (1990); Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for
Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REv. 583 (1989). For an interesting combination
of this criticism with some empirical research into people's actual privacy preferences, see
Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Au-

tonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized
and Permitted by Society," 42 DuKE LJ. 727 (1993).
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packet taken from a suspect's pocket.145 The difference does not
make sense in privacy terms. It nevertheless accomplishes something important. It helps to keep search doctrine focused on what
the police do in day-to-day criminal investigation, not on what the
government does when gathering information for other purposes.
It would be hard to explain, after all, why the police should be subject to serious Fourth Amendment constraints when seeking financial records from banks but other government officials should be
able to see a wide range of financial records on request. So too,
inspecting suspects' garbage is much more like the sort of thing environmental regulators do than is a typical street stop. Focusing on
coercive police-citizen interactions helps keep Fourth Amendment
privacy protection in its place.
The second example concerns non-police searches. Environmental regulators need to go on targets' land to take soil samples.
OSHA inspectors need to look around places of business. Building
code inspections sometimes require entry into private homes. Government employers sometimes want to search employees' desks or
file cabinets, and school principals sometimes search students' lockers. All these things are unquestionably Fourth Amendment
"searches," even given the strange set of cases discussed in the preceding paragraphs.
These practices are not, however, subject to ordinary Fourth
Amendment standards. The Supreme Court says that the ordinary
rules, such as the probable cause standard and the warrant requirement, do not apply when the government has "special needs" at
stake.146 Oddly enough, these special needs do not include the
need to solve or prevent serious crimes. They do include the need
to investigate schoo1141 or employee misconduct,148 the need to run
a regulatory inspection system,149 and the like. And when special
needs are found, the working Fourth Amendment rule seems to be
something like a shock-the-conscience test: unless the government
behavior was outrageous, the search is constitutionally reason145. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); see supra note 14 (discussing
Robinson).

146. The phrase comes from New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun,
J., concurring). It has since become a staple of Supreme Court opinions in nontraditional
Fourth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, '073-74 (19'07) (search
of probationer); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (19'07) (search of automobile junkyard}; O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (19'07) (plurality opinion) (search of government employee's office}.
147. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) ..
148. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
149. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (19'07).
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able.150 Indeed, searches are almost automatically "reasonable"
when conducted for some reason other than enforcing the criminal
law. This result is perverse in privacy terms: the privacy interest in
a student's purse does not depend on whether a school principal or
a police officer is searching it, and the countervailing government
interest is probably stronger in the latter case.
Yet the Court seems to sense in these cases that a different result would lead to something very much like open-ended substantive review. New York v. Burger15 1 offers a nice example of the
problem. In that case the Court sustained a statute152 that allowed
the police to inspect the records and premises of automobile junkyards (presumably in order to prevent them from buying and dismantling stolen cars).153 The statute required neither probable
cause nor reasonable suspicion; inspections were undertaken at the
discretion of the police. Suppose the case had come out differently
- suppose the Court had required, as a prerequisite to searching,
that the officer have probable cause to believe that the junkyard
either had violated the law or contained evidence of a violation.
The state could easily react by enacting a set of detailed regulations
covering every aspect of the junkyarp's business, including the
kinds of buildings and tools that can be used, the number of employees allowed, the location and type of fences surrounding the
property, the number of cars that can be stored, and so forth regulations the state need not have any intention of really enforcing. If the regulations were detailed enough and if the police did
not systematically enforce them, all junkyards would be violating
some rule at all times, probable cause would thus be easy to establish, and the police could search whenever they pleased - the same
result as under the statute the Court upheld in Burger. The only
way to avoid this result, the only way to keep the state from evading
the limits on police authority, would be to limit the kinds of regulations the state could enact.154 The Court's decision in Burger avoids
150. See Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L.
REv. 1, 43 (1991) (noting that "reasonableness" in these cases seems to mean not only less
than probable cause but also less than reasonable suspicion); William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REv. 553, 554 (1992)
(equating the standard with rational-basis review in constitutional cases).
151. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
152. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 415-a{5) {McKinney 1986).
153. 482 U.S. at 712.
154. See Stuntz, supra note 150, at 583-85. The system could avoid this box by limiting
the discretion of the police, but that is a terribly difficult business - one reason why police
and prosecutorial discretion have been largely exempt from legal regulation. Precisely this
choice arose in the cases invalidating vagrancy and loitering laws. A large part of the problem in those cases was connected with the way official discretion was being exercised. See
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this problem by treating the junkyard owner's privacy interest as of
no account. Once again, the law sets a boundary line, protects privacy on one side of the line, and ignores it on the other. The result
is to limit criminal procedure's substantive effect.
The third and clearest example of this phenomenon is one that
today is taken for granted: the overturning of Boyd's rule barring
government inspection of private papers. Beginning with Fisher v.
United States155 in 1976, the Court did away with the Fifth Amendment bar on subpoenas for some sorts of documents. Under Fisher,
suspects may refuse to turn over potentially incriminating documents only if the act of production would incriminate them; the incriminating effect of the documents themselves is not enough.156
Fisher's rule had two effects. First, searches for documents became
permissible if backed up by probable cause and, where necessary, a
warrant. The absolute bar of the privilege against self-incrimination no longer applied. 157 Second, Fisher left subpoenas for documents virtually unrestricted. As it stands now, subpoenas are
subject only to the twin requirements that the material sought be
relevant to a legitimate investigation and that compliance with the
subpoena not be too burdensome.158 These requirements are, in
practice, lax. Thus, in the century since Boyd we have gone from
absolute protection of one's papers to almost no protection.
This change is senseless in privacy terms: as Boyd recognized,
papers are among one's most private possessions. But the alternative would have a significant effect on the administrative state,
given the widespread reliance of regulatory agencies on the subpoena power. Indeed, prior to Fisher, the Boyd rule was tolerable
only because Hale denied Fifth Amendment protection to corporations and (usually) corporate officers, while Shapiro v. United
States159 and its progeny denied such protection to any records the
Jeffries, supra note 50, at 215-18. The system in effect chose substantive review by invalidating the statutes.
155. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
156. 425 U.S. at 408-13.
157. This effect was confirmed by Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). In Andresen, decided two months after Fisher, the Court upheld the search and seizure of some files in
an attorney's office, citing Fisher repeatedly for the proposition that the privilege against selfincrimination did not bar the search. 427 U.S. at 472-77.
158. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. For the Fourth Amendment limits on
subpoenas, see United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973). Dionisio does not wholly rule
out Fourth Amendment challenges to grand jury subpoenas, but it does limit those challenges
to subpoenas that are "too sweeping in [their] terms 'to be regarded as reasonable.' " 410
U.S. at 11 (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906)).
159. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
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government required individuals to keep. Fisher merely finished
the job that Hale and Shapiro started.
The common theme in these examples seems obvious. Where
privacy protection 'would lead most directly to substantive constraint on government regulation, the law has abandoned all pretense of protecting privacy. That practice has worked, after a
fashion: no one today worries about the substantive implications of
search and seizure or self-incrimination law. But it leaves huge discontinuities within Fourth and Fifth Amendment doctrine - gaps
that cannot be bridged within the existing legal framework.
The reason for these discontinuities also seems obvious. The
law is based on a principle - serious protection of informational
privacy - that has implications we cannot tolerate. The substantive consequences of privacy protection may have been acceptable
in Boyd's era (though not for long even then), but they are not
acceptable now. Perhaps it is time to reconsider the protection.

m.

RETinNKING PRIVACY PRoTECTioN

Criminal procedure's focus on privacy has costs that go beyond
the lack of analytic tidiness. The cost is not that the police are overregulated, though in some respects they are. On the contrary, the
exaltation of privacy in criminal procedure has left the police underregulated, by focusing attention on the least serious injuries that
police misconduct can cause. To understand why, one must look at
the differences between the sorts of police investigation that infringe on privacy the most and the police tactics that are the most
common subjects of constitutional regulation.

A. House Searches and Street Stops
The law of criminal procedure has never done a good job of
defining its goals with any precision. Instead, the doctrine has
seemed to flow out of a few paradigmatic problems - as if to say,
whatever else we want to do, we surely want to prevent this - leaving courts to analogize new cases to the familiar paradigms. The
dominant paradigm in search and seizure law has always been the
ransacking of a private home, with an emphasis on rummaging
around through the homeowner's books and papers. This image fits
the pair of eighteenth-century cases that had the most to do with
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the Fourth Amendment's creation:160 in both Entick v. Carrington161 and Wilkes v. Wood, 162 the King's agents searched the
plaintiff's home and carted off his books and papers for inspection.
It also fits Mapp v. Ohio, 163 the most famous Fourth Amendment
case of this century: the officers in Mapp did a top-to-bottom
search of a boarding house, and the evidence they found consisted
of a few dirty books that belonged to the house's owner.164
Focusing on cases like Entick and Wilkes and Mapp, one can see
why courts would use Fourth Amendment law to protect informational privacy. And protecting privacy in the home casts a smaller
substantive shadow than protecting privacy in glove compartments
or jacket pockets. The regulatory state does not usually snoop
around in people's bedrooms, and the privacy content of what police can find there is plausibly distinguishable from the kinds of information the state seeks for regulatory purposes. The same is true
for electronic eavesdropping, another police tactic that has generated more than its share of leading cases. Katz v. United States, 1 65
the case that spawned the "reasonable expectation of privacy" doctrine, was a wiretapping case, and the key opinion in that case begins by analogizing the wiretap of a telephone booth to the search
of a home.166 So too, Justice Brandeis's famous dissent in Olmstead
v. United States161 argued for a ban on warrantless electronic eavesdropping by emphasizing the interest in privacy and by analogizing
the practice to house searches.1 68 In these cases the house search
paradigm seems to work. It is no surprise that when officers rummage through suspects' dresser drawers, read their correspondence,
or listen to their conversations, courts care deeply about individuals' ability to keep some aspects of their lives secret from the
government.
160. See Amar, supra note 5, at 1176-77 & n.208; see also NELSON B. LAssoN, THE HisTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTII AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CoNSTITU-

TION 43-50 (1937).

161. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
162. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
163. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
164. 367 U.S. at 644-45. There is another common thread to Entick, Wilkes, and Mapp:
all are free speech cases in disguise. Entick and Wilkes were both triggered by seditious libel
charges. Mapp was litigated in the Supreme Court as a First Amendment case. See 367 U.S.
at 672-73 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The crime charged - possession of obscene materials was later invalidated on First Amendment grounds. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
165. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
166. 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
167. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
168. 277 U.S. at 473-474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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But most of what the police do is quite different from house
searches and wiretaps. Street encounters and car stops involve
much less private disclosure than the kinds of searches in Mapp and
Katz; they also involve other sorts of harm that may not be captured by the law's focus on informational privacy. And there are
many, many more street encounters than searches of private homes.
House searches turn out not to be so paradigmatic after all.169

169. For most of our constitutional history, it made no difference whether house searches
were representative of searches generally, because the law of criminal procedure all but ignored contacts between police officers and citizens outside the home. Search incident to
arrest doctrine made it easy for police to search anyone they could legitimately arrest, and
old-style vagrancy and loitering laws made it easy to arrest almost anyone. See William O.
Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE LJ. 1 (1960); Foote, supra note 50.
Plus, before Mapp, the only remedy for illegal searches in most jurisdictions was a trespass
action against the offending officer. Such suits were rarely a worthwhile response to street
encounters. Even if it were otherwise, damages suits are not very valuable to the sorts of
plaintiffs of whom juries disapprove, a characterization that probably fits most victims of
illegal police behavior on the street. Finally, by the mid-twentieth century the police had
good-faith immunity in damages suits, which, given the virtual absence of legal constraint,
made establishing liability just about impossible. See David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. CoLO. L REv. 1, 47-55 (1972) (discussing the rise of government officials' good-faith immunity). Nor did the privilege against selfincrimination make up for Fourth Amendment law's deficiencies. Before Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the privilege was inapplicable to police questioning. See Yale
Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1966) (criticizing that state of
affairs). It is nothing short of astonishing how little the law of criminal procedure had to do
with ordinary law enforcement on the streets.
Then came the 1960s. The exclusionary rule made it possible for victims of police misconduct to avoid hostile juries and provided an incentive to raise claims whenever evidence was
found, not just in large-scale search cases. Equally important, vagrancy and loitering laws
were invalidated on vagueness grounds, eliminating the de facto arrest power (together with
its ancillary search authority) that officers had previously held. See Stuntz, supra note 150, at
559-60 & nn.27-29. These changes made Fourth Amendment law, for the first time, important not only to house searches but also to the mass of informal street encounters between
police officers and suspects.
One might have expected some serious rethinking of what the Fourth Amendment is
about as the law established itself in this new, vast arena. But the house search paradigm has
continued to hold sway. In the past generation, Fourth Amendment cases involving the police have been obsessed with two legal issues: whether a "search" has taken place, and if so,
whether the police must get a warrant. The first issue is controlled by an analysis generated
in a wiretapping case and modeled on the problem of house searches. See Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (making the comparison with house
searches). Predictably, that analysis focuses on what the officer saw and what he knew when
he saw it. This approach may capture the individual interests at stake when officers are
rooting around in the bedroom closet, but it does less well when they are performing a patdown on the street. The warrant issue is also modeled on house searches, for which the
warrant requirement is well-settled. In street encounters, requiring warrants would be impossible: warrants involv~ planning and delay, while most police-citizen encounters are unplanned and require on-the-spot decisions. That is one reason why warrants are rarely
required except for searches of private homes. Still, the fact that warrants have been such a
persistent issue in other cases shows how much litigation has been shaped by the image of
house searches.
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Consider a typical 1990s Fourth Amendment case. In Fl.orida v.
Jimeno, 170 a police officer pulled over the defendant's car, ostensibly because of a minor traffic violation but actually because the officer suspected drug activity. The officer gave Jimeno a ticket, told
him that the officer had reason to believe drugs were in the car, and
asked permission to search. Jimeno said yes, and the officer found
a brown paper bag on the floor of the car. The officer opened the
bag, which contained a kilogram of cocaine.111
Jimeno is like many, perhaps most, contemporary search and
seizure cases. An officer approached a suspect with some suspicion
but not enough to justify an arrest, and in the course of the encounter the officer uncovered information that did justify an arrest. The
Supreme Court's focus in Jimeno is also typical. Both the majority
opinion and the dissent concerned themselves solely with the question whether Jimeno's consent to search the car included consent to
the opening of the paper bag. In other words, all the Justices focused on the scope of the officer's search. The majority concluded
that opening the bag was proper because the suspect made no exceptions when he gave consent to search the car.172 The dissent
argued that opening the bag was impermissible because of the supposedly heightened privacy interest in closed containers found in
cars.113
The Court's conclusion is hardly surprising. The dissenters' argument notwithstanding, the privacy interest at stake in Jimeno
seems trivial. If Jimeno had been innocent, the paper bag would
likely have contained nothing more personal than lunch. This is a
far cry from house searches and wiretaps. If privacy is what the
system is supposed to protect in cases of this sort, and if the house
search paradigm governs, it is easy enough to conclude that the encounter with Jimeno was perfectly reasonable.
Courts nearly always so conclude in cases of this sort. The usual
doctrinal vehicle is consent. Nominally, a search is consensual if a
reasonable person in the suspect's position would have felt free to
decline the officer's request. 174 Of course, if that standard were
taken seriously in Jimeno, it is hard to imagine anyone concluding
that the search in that case was consensual. A uniformed, armed
police officer had just stopped Jimeno's car and told him he was
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

500 U.S.
500 U.S.
500 U.S.
500 U.S.

248 {1991).
at 249-50.
at 251-52.
at 253-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 {1991).
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suspected of drug trafficking. Not many people would say "no" to
the police under those circumstances. After all, Jimeno was "consenting" to a search that he knew would uncover a kilogram of cocaine. Either he was crazy or, more plausibly, he assumed he had
no choice.175 As the Court's decision suggests, the real standard
applied in cases of this sort is not the "reasonable person" test that
courts cite but rather a kind of Jeopardy rule: if the officer puts his
command in the form of a question, consent is deemed voluntary
and the evidence comes in.
This approach to consent is perfectly predictable given the law's
focus. The privacy interest in Jimeno was small, and the officer was
not actfug on any illegitimate motive. In any balance of law enforcement need and individual privacy interest, therefore, the balance tips strongly in the government's favor; pretty much any
government interest will suffice. Bending the definition of consent
to let the evidence in is a natural response.
But privacy is not the primary interest at stake in cases of this
sort. If Jimeno had not had drugs in the car, what would have bothered him most about the encounter with the police officer? Surely
not the discovery of the contents of the paper bag. The real harm in
a case like Jimeno arises from the indignity of being publicly singled
out as a criminal suspect and the fear that flows from being targeted
by uniformed, armed police officers. Street encounters are not like
house searches. The harm flows not from the search but from the
encounter. The question should not be whether the officer had the
suspect's permission to look at something. Permission will always
be more fictive than real anyway. Rather, the question should be
whether the officer's behavior was too coercive given the reason for
the encounter. It is not the reasonableness of looking in the paper
bag that ought to matter; it is the reasonableness of treating Jimeno
175. As the facts in Jimeno show, this point often holds true even when the suspect is
explicitly told that he need not consent to the search. Jimeno was given such a warning, see
500 U.S. at 249, but the officer also told him that if he did not consent the officer would seek
a warrant to search the car. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3, Jimeno
(No. 90-622) (citing the record of Jimeno's suppression hearing). On the facts then available
to the officer, a warrant seemed implausible. See id. at 2 (noting that the officer's suspicion
of drug activity was based on a snippet of an overheard conversation on a payphone). At
least the officer must have thought so, since, under established Fourth Amendment law, he
was free to search the car without a warrant if he had probable cause to believe drugs were
inside. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Why, then, would the officer threaten
to seek a warrant? The likeliest answer is that the officer wished to suggest (1) that if Jimeno
refused consent to search, the car would probably be seized by the police pending a warrant
application {the threat to seek a warrant would have made no sense if Jimeno could simply
drive away), and (2) that in the end, the car would be searched with or without Jimeno's
consent
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like he was a probable drug courier. By focusing on privacy and
information gathering, the law fails to engage the real issue.
There is also a more serious problem. Consider the facts of a
now-venerable Fourth Amendment case, Terry v. Ohio.176 Officer
McFadden saw Terry and two friends walking back and forth in
front of a downtown Cleveland store; McFadden thought the three
men were planning a robbery. The officer walked over and asked
them what they were doing. Terry mumbled a response. McFadden
grabbed Terry, spun him around, and frisked him, finding a gun.
Then McFadden told the men to go inside a nearby store, where
they were ordered to spread their arms and legs against the wall.177
Under current law, there were two key moments in this incident:
the moment when Terry and his colleagues were no longer free to
walk away, and the search of Terry's pockets for weapons. McFadden needed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the
first178 and reasonable suspicion that weapons might be present to
justify the second.179 Note that the standard for searching Terry's
pockets is harder to meet than the standard for seizing him on the
street.
Yet if Terry had had no gun - if he had been doing nothing
more than window shopping - what would he have thought was
the most significant aspect of the encounter? Surely not the violation of the sanctity of his coat pockets. People do not usually carry
things in their coat pockets because they are trying to conceal them;
they do so because it is convenient. The most important aspect of
this or any other street stop to an innocent suspect must be some
combination of the stigmatizing nature of the encounter and the
police officer's use of force. McFadden didn't just ask Terry to
empty his pockets; McFadden grabbed him and spun him around.
In one of the companion cases to Terry, the officer grabbed the suspect by the shirt collar and frisked him at gunpoint;1so as in Terry
176. 392 U.S. 1 {1968).
177. 392 U.S. at 5-7.
178. 392 U.S. at 27-28. Actually, the Terry Court did not take a clear stand on what was
required to justify seizing Terry; the Court's opinion is dominated by its discussion of the
search of Terry's pockets. See also 392 U.S. at 19 n.16 {leaving open precisely when Terry was
first "seized"). Since Terry, the Court has made clear that the standard for a seizure of this
sort is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221
{1985).
179. 392 U.S. at 20-27.
180. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union at 5-6, Peters v. New York, 389 U.S.
950 {1967) (No. 74) in KURLAND & CASPER EDS., supra note 7, at 468-69. Note that the
amount of force used in a Terry stop can escalate dramatically given any sign of resistance by
the suspect - including such mild forms of resistance as asking the officer questions or
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the stop and frisk were deemed reasonable. 1s1 These aspects of the
encounter harm innocent suspects. Yet stigma and police use of
force, which are obviously at the heart of the Terry facts, play a
surprisingly small role in Terry doctrine. If McFadden had discreetly approached Terry and his friends, quietly telling them not to
walk away and to empty their pockets, never laying a hand on them,
behaving throughout in a way that called no attention to the encounter, it would have made no legal difference. Legally, the scope
of the search matters more than the coerciveness of the encounter.
Yet ordinary people in Terry's shoes must care most about the
latter.
McFadden's move was a very small instance of a kind of police
behavior that happens all the time, often with a good deal more
severity, and yet receives astonishingly little legal regulation: lowlevel violence against suspects. Often the violence is reasonable.
(In Terry, it probably was.) But that is not always the case. And
surely police violence deserves as much regulation as finding out
what was in Terry's jacket.
The premise of current doctrine is otherwise. One who studies
the law of criminal investigation cannot help wondering at the
chasm between the mass of rules and regulations governing where
the police can look and what they can touch when they look there,
and the virtual absence of any constitutional constraint on when
police can strike a suspect.182 Of course, looking in jacket pockets
implicates the interest in keeping secrets, while grabbing suspects,
spinning them around, and holding them at gunpoint does not. So
at one level the law is easy to explain. It looks primarily to privacy,
the backbone of Fourth Amendment doctrine. But in terms of ordinary people's valuation of their own interests, the privacy interest is
dwarfed by the interest in avoiding unnecessary violence or the unreasonable exercise of police coercion. All our talk about privacy
may have had the effect of stunting constitutional conversation
about those more serious problems.
This disease infects even house search cases. Consider one
more example: Anderson v. Creighton, 183 the leading case on the
mildly objecting to being stopped. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABoVB nm
LAW: POI.ICE AND TiiE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 101-03 {1993).
181. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66 {1968).
182. Compare, for example Professor LaFave's brief treatment of excessive force claims,
see 3 LAFAVE, supra note 29, at 411-14, witb his treatment of warrantless searches of persons
and personal effects, see 3 id. at 437-560. The latter is a relatively small slice of the law of
searches.
183. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).

March 1995]

Privacy's Problem

1067

scope of police officers' qualified immunity from damages litigation. Officers entered the Creightons' home in search of Mrs.
Creighton's brother, who, unbeknownst to the Creightons, was a
suspect in an armed robbery. The statement of facts from the court
of appeals opinion in the case bears quoting:
Mr. Creighton asked the officers to put their guns away because
his children were frightened, but the officers refused. Mrs. Creighton
awoke to the shrieking of her children, and was confronted by an officer who pointed a shotgun at her. She allegedly observed the officers yelling at her three daughters to "sit their damn asses down and
stop screaming." She asked the officer, "What the hell is going on?"
The officer allegedly did not explain the situation and simply said to
her, "Why don't you make your damn kids sit on the couch and make
them shut up."
One of the officers asked Mr. Creighton if he had a red and silver
car. As Mr. Creighton led the officers downstairs to his garage, where
his maroon Oldsmobile was parked, one of the officers punched him
in the face, knocking him to the ground, and causing him to bleed
from the mouth and forehead. Mr. Creighton alleges that he was attempting to move past the officer to open the garage door when the
officer panicked and hit him. The officer claims that Mr. Creighton
attempted to grab his shotgun, even though Mr. Creighton was not a
suspect in any crime and had no contraband in. his home or on his
person. Shaunda, the Creightons' ten-year-old daughter, witnessed
the assault and screamed for her mother to come help. She claims
that one of the officers then hit her.
. . . Mrs. Creighton's mother later brought Shaunda to the emergency room at Children's Hospital for an arm injury caused by the
officer's rough handling.184
Mrs. Creighton's brother was not in the house. The Creightons
sued, claiming that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.
On the facts, the Creightons had two plausible Fourth Amendment claims: (i) the police illegally entered their home, meaning
that the police lacked either probable cause or exigent circumstances (the latter being necessary to excuse the failure to get a warrant), and (ii) the conduct of the police after they entered the
Creightons' home was unreasonable - that is, whether or not the
initiation of the search was permissible, the conduct of the search
was not. The second claim seems much stronger than the first. After all, the police were in pursuit of a fugitive and had at least some
reason, though perhaps not enough, to think the fugitive might be
184. Creighton v. City of St Paul, 766 F.2d 1269, 1270-71 (8th Cir. 1985), vacated sub
nom. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). The court of appeals was reviewing a
decision on defendants' motion for summary judgment, so these are the facts as viewed most
favorably for the Creightons.
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at the Creightons' home. But it is hard to see how the police could
justify their behavior once inside if the Creightons' version of the
facts is anywhere close to the truth.
Yet every court that discussed the Creightons' Fourth Amendment claim took for granted that the only possible challenge was to
the officers' initial entry.185 In the end, the defendants won on summary judgment on the ground that reasonable police officers could
well have believed that both probable cause and exigent circumstances were present.186 This posture is typical. In Professor
LaFave's treatise on search and seizure, whole chapters are devoted
to the doctrines limiting entry into a house and entry into different
parts of a house once inside,187 but one finds almost no discussion
of limits on the degree of force used in conducting an otherwise
permissible search.
That fits the larger pattern of Fourth Amendment law. A focus
on privacy has led to a great deal of law - sometimes fairly protectj.ve, sometimes not - about what police officers can see. The doctrine pays a good deal less attention to what police officers can do.
This is part of the cost of a Fourth and Fifth Amendment culture
that has worried too much about privacy and too little about everything else.
B. Solving Privacy's Problem
There are signs that this state of affairs is changing, that police
coercion is displacing privacy as a focus of attention in the law of
criminal investigation. This change is a good thing; it should proceed. Yet the shift from privacy to coercion carries with it important difficulties. A reoriented criminal procedure system will have
to grapple with some major problems that the current regime manages to suppress or ignore.
The move away from privacy protection has proceeded quite far
in Fifth Amendment law. A generation ago, Fifth Amendment law
was as firmly anchored in privacy as Fourth Amendment law.
Under Boyd, the Fifth Amendment protected physical evidence as
well as ordinary testimony. The immunity required to overcome
that protection was transactional,188 meaning that the protection
185. See Anderson, 483 U.S. 635; Creighton, 166 F.2d 1269 (same case); Appendix to Peti·
tion for C'..ertiorari at 23a-26a, Anderson (No. 85-1520).
186. Creighton v. Anderson, 724 F. Supp. 654, 661 (D. Minn. 1989), affd., 922 F.2d 443
{8th Cir. 1990).
187. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 29, §§ 4.5, 4.8, 6.1-6.7.
188. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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was, as a practical matter, close to absolute. The law was pretty
much where Boyd, Hale, and Shapiro left it - focused on privacy,
but with the protection carefully bounded so as not to interfere too
much with ordinary government operations. Justices talked about
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as belonging together, as protecting much the same thing.189 Today, physical evidence is unprotected,190 immunity is narrower,191 and Fifth Amendment
protection has generally shrunk. Coercion has come to the fore,
and privacy has taken a back seat.
Th.is trend is especially evident in police interrogation doctrine.
At its inception, the rule of Miranda v. Arizona192 protected individual privacy and autonomy. By warning suspects that they need
not talk and could have legal assistance if they wished, and by placing a "heavy burden" on the government to show that these rights
had been waived "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently,"193 Miranda seemed to ensure that suspects would not make incriminating
disclosures unless they chose - really chose - to do so. Language
in Earl Warren's majority opinion suggested that the government
was not allowed to "persuade, trick, or cajole [the suspect] out of
exercising his constitutional rights."194 Miranda was thus of a piece
189. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961) ("We find that, as to the Federal
Government, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and, as to the States, the freedom from
unconscionable invasions of privacy and the freedom from convictions based upon coerced
confessions do enjoy an 'intimate relation' "); 367 U.S. at 661-66 (Black, J., concurring) Gustifying the imposition of the exclusionary rule on the states in terms of the relationship between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments).
190. See F!Sher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966).
191. Under Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the government must immunize both the compelled testimony and its fruits, but it need not immunize the entire transaction that is the subject of the compelled testimony. This requirement is narrower than the
transactional immunity rule of Counselman v. Hitchcock. As Akhil Amar and Renee Lettow
demonstrate elsewhere in this issue, there is a plausible argument for narrowing the immunity rule even further. See Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First
Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857 (1995).
192. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
193. 384 U.S. at 444, 475.
194. 384 U.S. at 455. Not everyone would agree with this characterization of Miranda. In
his fascinating article on the common threads that run through Brown v. Board of Education
and Miranda, Louis Michael Seidman argues that the Court's decision was actually a move in
favor of law enforcement. According to Seidman, Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964), and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), had paved the way for true free choice
for suspects - no police station confessions without the presence of defense counsel, a rule
which would presumably mean almost no police station confessions at all. See Seidman,
supra note 5, at 733-36. In Miranda, he claims, the Court took a step back from this position,
giving suspects formal protection through the famous warnings, while leaving the substance
of the coercive atmosphere of the police station unchanged. Id. at 736-47.
Seidman's argument is powerful, and it has strong echoes in current police interrogation
doctrine. But if Miranda represented a backward step from Massiah and Escobedo, it was a
small step. The fact that the Court went out of its way to condemn trickery as well as arm-
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with privacy-protective Fourth Amendment law - just as Fourth
and Fifth Amendment law had been closely linked, and linked to
privacy, ever since Boyd.
But Miranda doctrine has moved along a path different from the
one Warren's opinion mapped out. The use of undercover agents
and other similarly deceptive tactics often do not count as "interrogation" and so are not subject to Miranda's restrictions.195 As for
direct questioning, officers are indeed allowed to "persuade, trick,
or cajole" suspects into talking, as long as suspects are given the
requisite warnings and agree to talk. Taking advantage of suspects'
ignorance, mistakes, and poor judgment is routinely permitted.196
Aside from the famous Miranda warnings themselves, two key limits on the police remain: if the suspect asks to stop the questioning,
it must stop,197 and if he asks for a lawyer, questioning cannot start
again except by the suspect's decision.198 This regime does a poor
job of protecting the privacy and autonomy interests that Miranda
sought to guard. It does a much better job of regulating police use
of force. Suspects are allowed to decide when the pressure is too
twisting, together with the "heavy burden" of showing waiver the Court placed on the gov·
ernment, suggest that Miranda, when it was decided, represented something close to the
"free choice" regime at which Massiah and Escobedo had hinted. Most importantly, no one
could have known at the time that large numbers of ordinary suspects in ordinary criminal
cases would actually agree to talk to police after being told that they did not have to (indeed,
that they could have a state-paid lawyer if they wished). Miranda may not look so radical in
hindsight, but I suspect it seemed radical in 1966. And it seemed radical in exactly the way
that Boyd may have seemed radical eighty years before - it served to shield large amounts
of information from government scrutiny by placing that information squarely in defendants'
control. Miranda was, in short, a classic privacy- and autonomy-protective decision.
195. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990); Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987).
For an argument that the Warren Court would have reached the same result, at least with
respect to electronic eavesdropping and undercover agents, see Yale Kamisar, The Warren
Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It Really So ProsecutionOriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in VINCENT BLASI ED., THE BURGER COURT:
THE CoUNTER-REVOLUTION TIIAT WASN'T 62, 63-64 (1983).
196. See, e.g., Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S.
523 (1987); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). For a discussion of the deception-coercion line that these cases draw, see \Vtlliam J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure,
75 VA. L. REv. 761, 814-22 (1989).
197. "If [an] individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during question·
ing, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." Michigan v. Mosley, 423
U.S. 96, 100 (1975) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74). Once a suspect has exercised his
right to remain silent the police may resume questioning "after the passage of a significant
period of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings," at least where the second inter·
rogation concerns a different crime than the first. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106.
198. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Once triggered, this protection is stunningly broad. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S.146 (1990) (holding that after a suspect has
invoked his right to counsel, the police may not reinitiate questioning even after suspect has
met with an attorney); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) (holding that after a suspect
has invoked his right to counsel, the police may not reinitiate questioning even about a differ·
ent offense).
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great by stopping the proceedings or asking for help, and, in theory
anyway, their requests must be honored. These rules give the police some incentive to avoid the most coercive tactics, because those
tactics will be among the ones most likely to cause the suspect to
stop the questioning. The doctrine still has serious problems: for
example, tentative requests for counsel are not honored,199 which
dilutes officers' incentive to avoid arm-twisting. But the law has
moved in precisely the right direction, away from protecting the interest in nondisclosure and toward protecting the interest in avoiding unreasonable police coercion.
Some developments in Fourth Amendment law might herald a
similar change of focus. Recall the pattern in the "reasonable expectation of privacy" cases. The cases increasingly look to whether
there has been a coercive encounter between a police officer and a
citizen. If there has, a "search" has probably taken place; if not, the
Fourth Amendment probably does not apply.200 Given this pattern,
street encounters may be underregulated, but at least they receive
more attention than searches of suspects' garbage or flights over
backyards. That is as it should be, for the interests at stake in street
encounters go far beyond privacy.
Yet the law has a long way to go. Cases like Jimeno need to be
evaluated in terms of the coerciveness of the police officer's behavior, not just in terms of what the officer saw and what he knew
199. Compare Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (declining to give any effect
to ambiguous requests for counsel) with Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The
Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Inte"ogation, 103 YALE LJ. 259 {1993) (arguing that
ambiguous requests are as far as many defendants will go toward invoking their Miranda
rights). This nonprotection of ambiguous requests for counsel contrasts strangely with the
overprotection of clear requests for counsel. See supra note 198.
200. Virtually all the Supreme Court decisions in which no reasonable expectation of
privacy was infringed also involve no police-citizen confrontation. See Florida v. Riley, 488
U.S. 445 (1989) (officers flew over defendant's property); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.
35 {1988) (officers examined garbage left for pick-up); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294
(1987) (officers looked inside a deserted open-air barn); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170
(1984) (officers walked through a privately owned field); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276 (1983) (officers used a beeper to monitor automobile movements); Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735 (1979) (officers received phone numbers called by the defendant through use of
a pen register); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 {1976) {officers obtained defendant's
financial records from a bank).
There are, of course, some exceptions to the pattern. Wiretaps are plainly searches, even
though they often require no confrontation between a police officer and an individual. The
same is true of surreptitious searches of houses. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705
{1984). But wiretaps and house searches aside, Fourth Amendment "searches" do tend
strongly to involve some coercive confrontation with the police.
There are other hints of a tum toward coercion in Fourth Amendment doctrine. In Wmston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985), the Court held that surgery on the defendant to remove a
bullet for evidentiary purposes would constitute an unreasonable search absent a demonstration of "compelling need." Though the Court talked about privacy interests in Winston, privacy here means the interest in avoiding a kind of physical violence.
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when he saw it, and certainly not in terms of the scope of the suspect's fictive consent. In cases like Anderson v. Creighton, courts
need to pay attention to the behavior of police officers during the
course of otherwise legitimate searches and not end the analysis after concluding that some search was authorized. Finally, courts
need to worry much less than they now do about the privacy interest in glove compartments and jacket pockets and brown paper
bags.
Three serious obstacles stand in the way of these changes. The
first and most obvious is remedial. Suppression of illegally obtained evidence, the primary tool for enforcing restrictions on the
police, is well suited to rules about evidence gathering - rules that
limit what the police can see. Suppression is less well suited to regulating police violence, because of the lack of a causal connection
between unreasonable use of force and the discovery of incriminating evidence. {There was no evidence gathering in the Rodney
King incident.) The existence of the exclusionary rule thus tends to
reinforce Fourth Amendment law's emphasis on privacy.
Yet though the exclusionary rule does tilt the system toward privacy, the tilt can be corrected, at least in part. A sensible system
might say that when police officers behave as they allegedly did in
Anderson v. Creighton, any evidence they find in the house should
be suppressed.201 The causal connection between the police misconduct and finding the evidence is convenient, but it need not be
crucial.2 02 Meanwhile, in the mass of cases like Jimeno that use
"consent" to justify the search, police coercion is causally connected
to evidence gathering. Nothing inherent in the suppression remedy
bars a court from asking out loud what some judges probably ask
sotto voce: Did the officer have a good enough reason for singling
out the suspect in this way and for using this degree of force? To
put it another way, the exclusionary rule does not dictate the substantive content of Fourth Amendment law. Miranda doctrine illustrates the point. There, the law has moved sharply in the direction
of regulating police coercion, and the exclusionary rule remains the
chief enforcement tool.
201. And the law should certainly provide protection for innocent victims of unreasonably performed searches - that is, for people like the Creightons.
202. The law already does so~ething similar with respect to arrest. When suspects are
arrested without probable cause, the ordinary remedy is to suppress any incriminating evidence found during or soon after the arrest. Doctrinally, this flows from the fact that so
many searches are predicated on legal arrest. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 29, §§ S.2-.3, S.S.
Functionany, this practice serves to deter wrongful arrests in roughly the same way that the
suppression remedy could deter excessive force in carrying out house searches.
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The remedial problem remains serious. There are some kinds of
police violence that the exclusionary rule cannot touch - again,
think of Rodney King. Other remedies such as damages actions
and criminal punishment have their own problems.203 But none of
these difficulties would prevent courts from paying more attention
to coercion and less to privacy in cases like Terry and Jimeno and
Creighton.

A second obstacle is more troubling. It is hard to spell out just
how much coercion is too much in cases like Jimeno, and it is hard
to generate legal rules that tell officers how to conduct a house
search like the one in Creighton. Extremely ambiguous law is probably unavoidable here; a rule structure governing police coercion
and violence is probably not a realistic possibility. Police behavior
in street encounters may not be susceptible to the Miranda solution:
a body of clear rules that can plausibly protect the values at stake
and be readily communicated to and understood by the police.
Some sort of negligence or gross-negligence standard may well be
the best the law can do.204
Criminal procedure faced precisely this problem during the
early years of the Warren Court. Before the 1960s, the chief federal
constitutional constraints on the police came from the Due Process
Clause.205 With respect to searches and seizures, due process
barred anything that shocked the Court's conscience.206 With respect to police interrogation, the law forbade the use of "involuntary" confessions;201 in practice, involuntariness meant anything
produced by (once again) shocking police misconduct.2os These
legal standards were hopelessly vague, and according to the conven203. The chief problem with both damages and criminal prosecution is overdeterrence. If
the remedy is used often enough to deter police misconduct, it will likely deter some good
police conduct as well.
204. The reason for adopting a gross negligence standard is the problem that underlies
qualified immunity: the risk of overdeterrence. See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GoVERNMENT: CmzEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 71-73 (1983). But qualified immunity
may itself take care of that problem by requiring something akin to clear illegality as a precondition to damages liability for constitutional violations. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635 (1987). Thus, qualified immunity may mean that a constitutional negligence standard translates into a gross negligence standard for purposes of damages liability.
205. Federal agents were still bound by the body of Fourth and Fifth Amendment rules
that had evolved out of Boyd.
206. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952).
207. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
208. For a nice discussion of just how little the voluntariness standard constrained the
police, see Kamisar, supra note 169, at 94-104.

1074

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 93:1016

tional wisdom of the time, their vagueness made them useless.209
The police could not know what was prohibited, so they simply ignored the law and did what they wanted, bearing the slight risk that
later on some judge's conscience would be shocked. If this kind of
uncertainty is the inevitable result of a legal regime that tries directly to address police coercion, that enterprise does not look
promising.
But the constitutional regime that the Warren Court rejected
had more problems than its vagueness. Pre-1960s law was not only
fuzzy, it was also extraordinarily lenient. Only truly egregious police conduct posed any risk of constitutional sanction. Given such
leniency and given that what was truly egregious was never clear, it
made perfect sense for police to ignore the governing legal standards. If essentially nothing is clearly illegal, and if most things are
clearly legal, the governing standards are not likely to shape behavior.210 One solution - the Warren Court's solution - was to incorporate the privacy value of Boyd, the value that was still the
centerpiece of Fourth and Fifth Amendment law, into the Due Process Clause and thereby enforce privacy-protective criminal procedure rules against the states. Following that path allowed the Court
to generate a detailed rule structure for criminal investigation,
much of which still stands today. It also heightened the conflict between criminal procedure and the rest of the constitutional order
and avoided doing much of anything about police violence.
A better solution would be simply to make the standards
tougher - to do the same thing the Court tried to do before the
1960s but with less of a bias in favor of the police. Even a gross
negligence standard for cases like Creighton would be a good deal
tougher than the "shock the conscience" regime of the 1950s.
Moreover, if leniency was as big a problem for 1950s law as was
vagueness, tougher standards would shape police conduct. Many
searches and seizures must be supported by probable cause, and
probable cause is defined as a "fair probability," judged under all
the circumstances.211 This is a classically vague standard. But it ap209. See id.; Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Crime and Confession, 79 HAR.v. L. REv. 21, 36-37
(1965). This position led to many calls for "codes" of one sort or another to solve the police
interrogation problem. See Paul M. Bator & James Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 CoLUM.
L. REv. 62 (1966); Arnold N. Enker & Sheldon H. Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v.
United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REv. 47, 84-91 (1964).
210. This statement is true unless the penalty for illegal behavior is extremely high. The
suppression remedy does not establish a very high penalty because it only forces the officer
to disgorge the evidentiary gains from his misconduct.
211. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-41 (1983).
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parently shapes behavior: a huge majority of searches pursuant to
warrants find evidence listed in the warrant,212 suggesting that police officers and magistrates manage to apply the probable cause
standard with some success. Case-by-case adjudication does, after
all, send legal signals. The police are receptive to those signals because they must be: they are very frequent litigants. In short, a fair
response to the concern with vagueness is that vague standards are
indeed a problem, but they are still worth something and, in any
event, are better than no standards at all.
A third obstacle is more serious still, for it goes to basic choices
about the way police operate on the streets. As anyone who reads a
newspaper knows, we are in the midst of a revival of "community
policing." What that term means is not entirely clear, but one central characteristic is sustained personal contact between police officers and citizens outside the context of officers' response to
reported crimes.213 The idea behind this movement is simple and
powerful. Community policing is a response to the fact that over
the past few decades, policing has become more reactive than it
used to be. Officers are less likely to "walk a beat," more likely to
patrol their territory in cars, and hence more likely to encounter
citizens as suspects and crime victims rather than simply as citizens.214 This development probably raises police efficiency if good
law enforcement consists solely of solving crimes. Police in cars can
get to the scene of a reported crime faster than officers on foot. But
it may lower efficiency if it hampers officers' ability to stop crimes
before they happen, perhaps by the judicious exercise of low-level
force against potential wrongdoers - anything from brief street
seizures to breaking up groups of troublemakers and forcing them
to go home. Officers can more easily use these sorts of informal,
fundamentally preventive tactics if they are regularly "making the
212. See Donald A. Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE LJ. 906, 925 {1986) (noting that,
according to a study of the warrant process sponsored by the National Center for State
Courts, about 74-89% of the searches discover at least some of the evidence named in the
warrant).
213. See generally JEROME H. SKOLNICK & DAVID H. BAYLEY, THE NEW BLUE LINE:
POLICE INNOVATION IN Soc AMERICAN CrrIEs {1986); Geoffrey P. Alpert & Roger G. Dunham, Community Policing, 14 J. POLICE Scr. & ADMIN. 212 (1986); Mark Harrison Moore,
Problem-solving and Community Policing, in 15 MODERN POLICING 99 (Michael Tonry &
Norval Morris eds., 1992). To date, the legal literature has devoted surprisingly little attention to this revival - an unfortunate omission, as community policing has major implications
for the shape of both criminal law and criminal procedure. For an interesting and balanced
preliminary discussion, see Debra A. Livingston, Brutality in Blue: Community, Authority,
and the Elusive Promise of Police Refonn, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1556, 1571-76 (1994) {book
review).
214. See, e.g., Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Police Organization in the TWentieth Century, in 15
MODERN POLICING, supra note 213, at 51, 91-92.
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rounds" on foot. Police cars create distance; they lead to a more
detached, and hence more reactive, law enforcement style.
If the advocates of community policing are right, the old way
was better. It is worth asking, then, why it was abandoned. One
answer bears strongly, and depressingly, on the law's ability to do a
good job of regulating police use of force. Before the 1960s, the
police could seize just about anyone on the street: vagrancy and
loitering laws applied to almost any public behavior, so the police
always had probable cause to arrest.21s When those laws were invalidated in the late 1960s and early 1970s, street seizures immediately became a legal problem.216 In the absence of blanket
authority to arrest, the police needed more specific grounds to justify ad hoc seizures on the street. But in many cases those grounds
did not exist - the whole point of informal, preventive police work
was to anticipate trouble, not to react to it. The gains to the police
from these interventions were and are small, meaning that even a
small risk of legal sanctions could generate a large amount of deterrence. So the police reacted to greater regulation by distancing
themselves. The movement from foot patrols to cars, from preventive to reactive policing, accelerated. The law created an incentive
to wait until crimes happened, after which reasonable suspicion and
probable cause would be easier to establish, rather than intervening
to stop them.
The story is of course more complicated than that; other variables were also at work.217 But if this account is even partly correct,
it suggests that some forms of policing can work only if the law
keeps its distance. Carefully regulating low-level seizures may well
be inconsistent with a style of police work that many people are
striving to recreate.21s
Regulation may still be the right move. Community policing
may be a bad idea. Still, this tension highlights something important. A large category of reasonable exercises of police coercion "reasonable" in the sense that given full information, a large majority of people across all major population groups would approve of
215. See, e.g., HERMAN GoIDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED PouCINo 134 {1990); Douglas,
supra note 169, at 12-13.
216. It is no accident that the "stop-and-frisk" cases arose at the same time vagrancy and
loitering laws were being struck down. See Stuntz, supra note 150, at 559-60.
217. The two most obvious are rising crime rates and rising political concerns with appar·
ent racism. The latter may have led still-largely-white police forces to scale back their street
presence in black neighborhoods.
218. See Moore, supra note 213, at 112-13 (noting the connection between reactive policing and the protection of individual privacy and liberty).
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the police conduct - may not be cost-effective in a system of caseby-case judicial scrutiny. The system may have to choose between
foreclosing all such police conduct or permitting it at the cost of
also permitting a good deal of misconduct, such as harassing citizens because of their race. Racism combined with broad police discretion was, after all, what prompted courts to invalidate vagrancy
and loitering laws in the first place.
The current regime manages to suppress these issues, by focusing attention on suspects' privacy interests and adopting a fictive
view of consent that allows a good deal of informal coercion to take
place. But this "solution" satisfies no one. Notwithstanding consent search doctrine, the police lack the kind of informal authority
that the old regime gave them - the kind of authority that may be
essential to effective community policing. Meanwhile, the system
does not come close to protecting the interests of people like Terry
or Jimeno in being free from police coercion.
Focusing squarely on coercion would force the system to face
these trade-offs. Regulating street encounters between the police
and the citizenry remains an incredibly hard job. The law of constitutional criminal procedure may be able to do that job only very
partially. It may be that most of the regulatory work must be done
by police chiefs and citizen review boards, by people and institutions operating outside the realm of constitutional law. But constitutional law can surely do more and better than it does now, if
courts focused on the right interest instead of paying so much attention to the wrong one. If unreasonable police use of force is the
most important problem for the law of criminal investigation to
solve, the fact that all solutions are partial and flawed is not reason
enough to abandon the enterprise.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A generation after Mapp v. Ohio, 219 we have a large and detailed body of law to tell police when they may open paper bags or
the trunks of cars. Meanwhile, the law speaks softly (or not at all)
when it comes to the level of force that may be used in making an
arrest or conducting a search. This structure is backward. Drawing
lessons from isolated cases is risky, but the Rodney King incident
may be symptomatic of the real problem of police misconduct. The
problem is not information gathering but violence.220 Notwith219. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
220. For a wide-ranging discussion of that problem, see
180.

SKOLNICK

& FYFE, supra note
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standing our enormous body of Fourth Amendment law and the
enormous volume of Fourth Amendment litigation, that problem
has not generated much of a legal response.
The law's relentless focus on privacy as secrecy has produced
this state of affairs, because privacy protection has little to do with
the worst aspects of police misconduct. And in a broader sense,
privacy protection as the centerpiece of criminal procedure is reactionary: it harks back to a constitutional order that placed severe
limits on the size and regulatory power of the state, limits that have
long since been discarded.
This doctrinal wrong turn may be the product of historical accident. The Supreme Court's decision to intervene heavily in criminal procedure was coupled with the decision to incorporate the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. At the time, Fourth and Fifth Amendment law was strongly linked to privacy protection, a product of
Boyd-era cases. Yet that privacy protection had already been
cabined and undermined in order to avoid running afoul of the
emerging regulatory state. The incorporation cases of the 1960s
thus imported privacy's problem into the day-to-day law of criminal
procedure, the law that governs ordinary car stops and arrests.221
We have been wrestling with the problem ever since. The result is a
system that does not consistently protect privacy because it cannot,
and hardly protects other interests at all. Criminal procedure needs
reorienting.
221. This account is discussed in some detail in Stuntz, supra note 105.

